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Balancing Exigency and Privacy in
Warrantless Searches to Prevent
Destruction of Evidence:
The Need for a Rule
Barbara C. Salken*
As courts administer the criminal law, they face a continu-
ing tension between the police's need to gather criminal evi-
dence and the people's right to privacy. The courts have had
particular difficulty striking that balance when defining the cir-
cumstances that justify a warrantless search of private prem-
ises to prevent destruction of evidence. The Supreme Court has
infrequently considered the question and has never provided a
clear standard for determining when warrantless action is justi-
fied.1 The courts of appeals have developed conflicting solutions
to the problem. 2 The current national preoccupation with drug
trafficking3 suggests that the government may more often seek
* Associate Professor of Law, Pace University. B.A. 1969, Skidmore College;
J.D. 1975, Brooklyn Law School.
I gratefully acknowledge the thoughtful editorial suggestions of my husband
Matthew J. Rosen and of Professors Donald L. Doernberg and Bennett L.
Gershman, as well as the research assistance of Thomas Kapp and Kevin
McGuckin.
1. See infra section I.
2. See infra sections II & III.
3. Between 1960 and 1985, for example, arrests for drug abuse violations
jumped from .7% of the total number of persons arrested in 1960 to 6.95% in 1985,
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to justify warrantless entries into private premises on the basis
of threatened destruction of evidence. Unlike most other evi-
dence, drugs can usually be destroyed with the flush of a toilet
or the opening of a tap.4 Public concern about the drug problem
encourages the police to intensify their enforcement efforts, 5
which in turn will increase the number of times police are faced
with a real or imagined possibility that evidence will be de-
stroyed. Attempts to broaden police power in this area must be
expected.
Notwithstanding the legitimate societal interest in crime
control, other important values are at stake. The fourth amend-
ment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and
seizures. 6 Its principal role is the promotion of freedom by lim-
an increase of almost 600%. FEDERAL BuREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES (July 1986). Estimates of cocaine importa-
tion have increased from 15-18 billion dollars in 1979 to 39 billion in 1984. Busch
& Schnoll, Cocaine-Review of Current Literature and Interface with the Law, in 3
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES & THE LAW 283, 285 (1985). In a recent survey of members
of the United States House of Representatives conducted by that body's Select
Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, 96% of the members responding to the
survey characterized the drug abuse in their districts as either moderate or severe,
with the reports equally divided between those two conditions. As a result of hear-
ings held by the Select Committee, the Committee found that:
(1) [t]he continuing spread and increasing intensity of the drug abuse
problem-in rural as well as in urban areas-with trafficking in a wide vari-
ety of drugs increasing at an alarming rate; and 2) [allmost all Members of
Congress have had constituents express concern about drug abuse and drug
trafficking and ask for congressional action to combat both problems.
Kurke, Congressional Review of National Problems in Drug Abuse and Its
Control, in 3 BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES & THE LAW 241, 244-45 (1985). President and
Mrs. Reagan have called for a "national crusade" against this "cancer of drugs."
Boyd, Reagans Advocate 'Crusade' on Drugs, N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1986, at 1, col.
1.
4. "[Tlhe possibility of destruction of evidence exists in every narcotics investi-
gation." United States v. Moreno, 701 F.2d 815, 818 (9th Cir. 1983), vacated, 758
F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1985).
5. Purdum, 200 Police Officers Being Added to Division to Combat Narcotics,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1986, at B1, col. 3.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. V reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
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iting governmental interference in the affairs of individuals, 7
although it is frequently discussed in terms of privacy.8 This
role has been described most eloquently by Justice Brandeis in
his famous dissent in Olmstead v. United States9 as "the right to
be let alone- the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men." 10 Thus, the fourth amendment
connotes a reverence for personal liberty that restricts the gov-
ernment from detaining a citizen even briefly without appropri-
ate cause,'1 respect for the sanctity of the home that demands
7. Freedom, after all, is the ability to do what one wants, which requires, at
least, the right to limit the manner and instance of governmental interference with
one's thoughts, actions and possessions. Privacy is certainly a value protected by
the amendment, but privacy, or the ability to control the personal information the
government acquires and the property one possesses, is a sub-value of freedom
itself. On freedom and property and their relation to popular sovereignty, see gen-
erally R. HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 12-22 (1948); G. WOOD,
THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 214-22 (1969); see also
Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MIm. L. REV. 349, 353-77
(1974).
8. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967); Warden v. Hay-
den, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967)("We have recognized that the principal object of the
Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy rather than property.. ."). Profes-
sor Weinreb describes the privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment as having
two distinct aspects. The first type of privacy protected by the fourth amendment
"enables us to do the things that we like to do but do badly, things that we are a bit
embarrassed about doing: to meet a friend quietly, to act out love and hate, to do
all the things that we should not do in the same way at high noon in Times
Square." The second type of privacy
allows us to extend our personality by stamping it on a place without dis-
playing it publicly. It allows us to leave our pajamas on the floor, the bed
unmade and dishes in the sink, pictures of secret heroes on the wall, a stack
of comic books or love letters on the shelf; it allows us to be sloppy or com-
pulsively neat, to enjoy what we have without exposing our tastes to the
world.
Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 52-53
(1974).
9. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
10. Id. at 478.
11. "No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common
law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own
person, free ,from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and un-
questionable authority of law." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (quoting Union
Pac. Rail v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)); see also Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979) (essential purpose of proscriptions in fourth amendment to
impose a standard of reasonableness upon exercise of discretion by governmental
officials in order to safeguard privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary
invasions); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975) (fourth
3
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the highest standard before that threshold may be crossed, 12
and regard for possession of property that prohibits the govern-
ment from seizing it without authorization or emergency. 13
The requirement that searches and seizures be conducted
pursuant to warrants issued only upon probable cause by a neu-
tral and detached magistrate is central to the fourth amend-
ment. 14 The warrant requirement has two effects. First, it
protects people against unjustified government interference
with their lives by restricting searches to those based on prob-
able cause.' 5 Second, it protects against capricious intrusions
conducted at the whim of government officials by requiring that
neutral magistrates authorize warrants. 16 Searches conducted
amendment requires reasonable seizure, and reasonableness depends on balance
between public interest and individual's right to personal security).
12. In Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), the Court stated:
The Fourth Amendment protects the individual;'s privacy in a variety of
settings. In none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when
bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual's home-
a zone that finds its roots in clear and specific constitutional terms: "The
right of the people to be secure in their... houses... shall not be violated."
That language unequivocally establishes the proposition that "[alt the very
core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his
own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion."
Id. at 589-90 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)); see
also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-75 (1971) (search or seizure
taking place on a suspect's property without a warrant is per se unreasonable,
unless police can show it falls within an exception).
13. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 700-02 (1983); Texas v. Brown, 460
U.S. 730, 747 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383, 393-95 (1914).
14. In Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948), for example, the Court
stated:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zeal-
ous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual
inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection con-
sists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached
magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often com-
petitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.
Id. at 13-14.
15. Amsterdam, supra note 7, at 411.
16. Id. The exercise of indiscriminate or arbitrary power is central to the con-
cerns of the fourth amendment. "The Fourth Amendment imposes limits on
search-and-seizure powers in order to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interfer-
ence by enforcement officials with the privacy and personal security of individu-
als." United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976); United States v.
Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 895 (1975); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878
(1975); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967); see Loewy, The
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol17/iss3/15
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without a warrant are "per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment-subject only to a few specially established and
well delineated exceptions."17 "These exceptions are 'jealously
and carefully drawn,' and there must be a 'showing by those
who seek exemption . . . that the exigencies of the situation
made [the search] imperative.' "18 The burden is on the govern-
ment to show that the search falls within one of the exceptional
situations.'9
Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229,
1239 (1983) ("The single theme running through the entire history of the fourth
amendment is arbitrariness."); Amsterdam, supra note 7, at 410-12.
17. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). It is impossible to iden-
tify an individual case in which the Supreme Court took a definitive position mak-
ing warrantless searches per se unreasonable. See Williamson, The Supreme
Court, Warrantless Searches, and Exigent Circumstances, 31 OKLA. L. REV. 110,
116 (1978). Rather, beginning in the dissents of Justice Frankfurter in the 1940s
and 1950s and continuing through the decisions of the 1960s, the Court has slowly
adopted the view that searches must be made pursuant to warrants unless ur-
gency and necessity justify other action. See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383 (1914) (no discussion of proper relationship between reasonable search
and warrant clause); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (recogniz-
ing that it was "reasonable" for Congress to permit warrantless searches of
automobiles when it was not "practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle
can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must
be sought."); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925) (recognizing right to
make warrantless search of house incident to lawful arrest); Harris v. United
States, 331 U.S. 145, 155 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (arguing that any
search or seizure conducted without a warrant was unreasonable unless the cir-
cumstances preclude the obtaining of a warrant); Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 10 (1948) (invalidating warrantless entry indicating that only "exceptional
circumstances" would suffice to dispense with a warrant, without explanation or
authority); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451,455 (1948) (reaffirming John-
son and adding that there were no facts showing that a delay to get a warrant
would have endangered the search); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 68
(1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)(repeating the argument made in his Harris
dissent).
18. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971) (quoting Jones v.
United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958), and McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S.
451, 456 (1948)).
19. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 US. 30, 34 (1970). The exceptions to the warrant
requirement include the following: automobile searches, Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132 (1925); searches pursuant to consent, Bumper v. North Carolina, 391
U.S. 543 (1968); searches incident to lawful arrest, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752 (1969); seizures in plain view, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443
(1971); limited searches and seizures under the stop and frisk doctrine, Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); searches and seizures in hot pursuit of a fleeing felon,
United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976); and searches and seizures in exigent
circumstances, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). Excluding consent, all
exceptions to the warrant requirement derive from an emergency. Mascolo, The
5
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Cases involving exigent circumstances, which by definition,
require immediate police action,20 fall within one of these excep-
tions. A warrantless search to prevent destruction of evidence
is a sub-category of this exception.21 The Supreme Court has
concluded that the need to prevent destruction of evidence is
one type of exigent circumstance that may justify warrantless
action but has not defined at what point the fear that evidence
might be destroyed becomes sufficient to justify warrantless ac-
tion. The Court has never approved a warrantless entry into
private premises on this basis,22 although it has suggested that
evidence "in the process of destruction"23 or "threatened with
destruction"24 may justify such action.
Despite the Supreme Court's lack of assistance,25 the circuit
courts frequently consider the question of whether, and at what
Emergency Doctrine Exception to the Warrant Requirement Under the Fourth
Amendment, 22 BUFFALO L. REV. 419, 425 (1973). The development of "specifically
established and well delineated exceptions" like search incident and automobile
searches was merely a recognition that certain circumstances presented emergen-
cies so frequently that the court was willing to accept the presence of an exigency
whenever the intrusion occurred in that factual situation without regard to
whether there was actually an emergency in the particular case. See United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
20. "Exigent circumstances" is the Supreme Court's category for events not
falling into the other specific exceptions but nonetheless requiring immediate ac-
tion. This exception allows for a warrantless search or seizure where there is a
compelling need for immediate official action and time does not permit the procure-
ment of a warrant. The Court considers the facts of each case to determine
whether it is a "now or never" situation. See, e.g., McDonald v. United States, 335
U.S. 451, 451-56 (1948).
21. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S.
10 (1948). Other approved purposes are (1) to discover the cause of a recent unex-
plained fire, Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978); (2) to retrieve a possibly
loaded gun vulnerable to discovery by vandals, Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433
(1973); and (3) to enter without a warrant when officers reasonably believe some-
one is inside premises in need of immediate aid, Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385
(1978).
22. In only one instance has the Court permitted a warrantless intrusion to
prevent the destruction of evidence. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
That case, however, was unique; it involved the alcohol content in the arrestee's
blood, evidence that was ineluctably being destroyed by the defendant's metabolic
process. No police action could have prevented its destruction, nor could the need
for a search warrant have been foreseen. Few other circumstances can provide
such urgency or inevitability.
23. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970).
24. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
25. The Court's lack of guidance may be the result of a conffict among its
members about the proper resolution of the problem. Opinions both in support of
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol17/iss3/15
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point, possible destruction of evidence justifies warrantless ac-
tion and have developed different approaches. 26 All of the cir-
cuits agree that destruction of evidence is an exigent
circumstance that may justify warrantless action, 27 but they do
not evaluate claims of exigency in the same manner. Numerous
approaches have emerged, but they can be grouped into three
categories: (1) the "examine-avoid" approach, exemplified by
courts that critically evaluate the police officer's assertion that
an emergency exists and also require that officers avoid war-
rantless action when possible; (2) the "uncritical" approach, il-
lustrated by courts that accept at face value the police officer's
assertion that an emergency exists and do not affirmatively re-
quire that police avoid warrantless action although possible;
and (3) the "examine-only" approach employed by courts that
critically evaluate the police officer's assertion that an emer-
gency exists, but do not require that officers avoid the need for
warrantless action although possible.
The divergent approaches in this area present two major
problems. First, inconsistent standards produce inconsistent
results, so that searches that are upheld in one circuit would be
condemned in another. A federal system, based on a single con-
stitution, cannot tolerate such a result. The constitution does
not guarantee greater or lesser degrees of freedom from govern-
mental intrusion based on geography. Every person has the
right to the same fourth amendment protections, whether he re-
sides in Montana or Mississippi. Second, and more dangerous,
the lack of firm guidance in this area permits some circuits to
view too generously the circumstances that justify warrantless
and dissenting from the denial of certiorari in United States v. Vasquez, 454 U.S.
975 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari) and 454 U.S. 983
(1981) (Brennan, J., with whom Justices White and Marshall joined, dissenting
from the denial of certiorari), show that at least four members of the Court disa-
gree about the meaning of the Court's cases in the area and the status of the law as
enforced in the circuits. In any event, despite the frequency with which the Court
is presented with the question, it has repeatedly refused to consider it. See, e.g.,
United States v. Webster, 750 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1106
(1985); United States v. Knobeloch, 746 F.2d 1366 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470
U.S. 1006 (1985); United States v. Palumbo, 742 F.2d 656 (1st Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1114 (1985); United States v. Palumbo, 735 F.2d 1095 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 934 (1984).
26. See infra section II.
27. See infra note 76.
19971
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action. This may presage development of a broad new exception
to the warrant requirement, seriously threatening traditional
fourth amendment values.
This Article examines the problem of preventing the de-
struction of evidence in the context of the fourth amendment's
warrant requirement. Section I examines the Supreme Court
decisions dealing with warrantless action to prevent the de-
struction of evidence. Section II discusses the circuits' discor-
dant approach to this issue. Section III illustrates the
divergent results produced by application of the three different
approaches developed in section II to a hypothetical case prob-
lem. Section IV discusses the need for a uniform rule for evalu-
ating official action in this area. Finally, in section V, this
Article proposes the following rule: Police may make a warrant-
less entry into private premises when: (1) they have probable
cause to believe that evidence of criminal activity is located
within; (2) they can articulate facts that create reasonable sus-
picion that evidence would be destroyed before a warrant could
be obtained; (3) the circumstances giving rise to the threat of
destruction must be neither avoidable by reasonably prudent of-
ficers nor created by them; and (4) the invasion of fourth
amendment interests should be no greater than the circum-
stances require to maintain the status quo until a warrant can
be obtained.28 This rule encourages police officers to use war-
rants but permits them to make informed decisions before mak-
ing warrantless entries. The standard authorizes warrantless
intrusions in specific, limited circumstances without undermin-
ing vital fourth amendment values.
I. The Supreme Court's Treatment of Warrantless Searches
to Prevent Destruction of Evidence
There are few United States Supreme Court decisions in-
volving threatened destruction of evidence, the Court having
considered the subject only six times. 29 In none of these cases
has the Court permitted a warrantless entry into premises
28. There are a few extraordinary circumstances where maintaining the sta-
tus quo will not protect the evidence. Police may be excused from alternative ac-
tion when the evidence is actually in the process of destruction.
29. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S.
30 (1970); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); United States v. Jeffers,
[Tribute
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based merely on the possibility that evidence might be de-
stroyed.30  Furthermore, none of the cases mentioning
threatened destruction of evidence contains extensive discus-
sion of the subject.
Vale v. Louisiana31 addresses the issue most directly. The
Court's language, however, suggests a standard that lower
courts have been reluctant to adopt. This language in Vale has
probably been the source of much of the existing confusion
among the circuit courts.3 2 Yet, the disagreement after Vale has
not been limited to lower courts; recent opinions by members of
342 U.S. 48 (1951); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948); Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
30. Since 1966, the Court has frequently mentioned destruction of evidence in
cases involving other issues but in no case has evidence actually been admitted on
that basis. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985) (police use of deadly force
to prevent escape of unarmed felon); Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 810
(1984) (evidence seized from private residence pursuant to valid search warrant
after illegal entry); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 n.14 (1983) (limits of
protective search); Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 780 (1983) (search of a previ-
ously lawfully searched container); Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 649 (1983)
(Marshall, J., concurring) (inventory search); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500
(1983) (seizure of defendant at airport); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457
(1981) (automobile search incident to arrest); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753,
759 (1979) (warrantless search of suitcase seized from trunk of taxicab); Mincey v.
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978) (warrantless search of murder scene); Zurcher v.
Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 563 (1978) (issuance of search warrant as to party
not suspected of crime); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978) (warrantless
search of fire scene); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43 (1976) (retreat into
private place by defendant following arrest in public place); United States v. Wat-
son, 423 U.S. 411, 435 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (warrantless arrest in pub-
lic place); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 592 n.7 (1974) (search of exterior of
defendant's automobile); United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 811 (1974)
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (search and seizure of clothing of defendant in custody);
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 230 (1973) (full search of person incident
to lawful custodial arrest); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 478 (1971)
(warrantless seizure of defendant's car from his driveway); United States v. White,
401 U.S. 745, 783 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (use of testimony of government
agents who monitored by radio transmitter conversations between defendant and
government informant); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (search in-
cident to arrest); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 46 (1968) (extent of intrusion
permissible pursuant to Terry stop); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968) (reason-
able search for weapons following "stop"). In the one case in which the Court has
upheld the seizure of evidence to prevent its destruction, the evidence (alcohol in
the blood) was being destroyed by the metabolism, a situation of limited applicabil-
ity. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). See infra notes 43-48 and ac-
companying text for a discussion of Schmerber.
31. 399 U.S. 30 (1970).
32. See infra notes 49-67 and accompanying text.
9
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the Supreme Court suggest a marked divergence of views
among the Justices. 33
A. The Exigency First Considered
The earliest references to potential destruction of evidence
as an independent justification for warrantless intrusions came
in the late 1940s in Johnson v. United States3 4 and McDonald v.
United States. 35 In both cases, the Court disapproved the
search, but implied that a warrantless search could be upheld
in an appropriate case.
In Johnson, the police had probable cause to believe opium
was being smoked in a hotel room, but they lacked a search
warrant. They knocked on the door and, after it was opened by
the occupant, announced their intention to search the prem-
ises.36 Affirming the suppression of the narcotics evidence dis-
covered during the search, Justice Jackson stated that:
[t]here are exceptional circumstances in which, on balancing the
need for effective law enforcement against the right or privacy, it
may be contended that a magistrate's warrant for search may be
dispensed with. But this is not such a case. No reason is offered
for not obtaining a search warrant except the inconvenience to the
officers and some slight delay necessary to prepare papers and
present the evidence to a magistrate. These are never very con-
vincing reasons and, in these circumstances, certainly are not
enough to bypass the constitutional requirement. No suspect was
fleeing or likely to take flight. The search was of permanent
premises, not of a movable vehicle. No evidence or contraband
was threatened with removal or destruction. .... 37
In McDonald, the Court again rejected the government's
claim that a warrantless search was justified by possible de-
33. See infra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
34. 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
35. 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
36. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 12.
37. Id. at 15. The Court's conclusion that no evidence was threatened with
destruction is puzzling. The police could smell the odor of burning opium emanat-
ing from the hotel room. There is no indication in the opinion that they had reason
to believe the amount of opium in the room exceeded the amount actually being
smoked, presumably in the bowl of one or more pipes. Therefore, there was a rea-
sonable basis to believe that the evidence in the room was literally going up in
smoke. The Court seemed to be saying that the officers' testimony that they
smelled opium would be as useful as the opium itself.
[Tribute
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struction of evidence. Police entered a rooming house upon
hearing the sounds of an adding machine, under circumstances
that gave them probable cause to believe the defendant was en-
gaged in illegal gambling. They arrested the defendant and
seized evidence used to convict him of running an illegal lottery.
The Court, in reversing the conviction, observed: "[T]he defend-
ant was not fleeing or seeking to escape. Officers were there to
apprehend petitioners in case they tried to leave. Nor was the
property in the process of destruction nor was it likely to be de-
stroyed as the opium paraphernalia in the Johnson case."3 8
Thus, destruction of evidence was not the deciding issue in
either Johnson or McDonald. In neither case were the suspects
aware of the police surveillance, nor were there other reasons to
think that the evidence would be destroyed or removed. In both
cases, the government also argued that the searches were valid
as incident to a lawful arrest,39 but the Court held that the un-
derlying arrests were unlawful and could not, therefore, sup-
port the subsequent warrantless searches. 40  The Court
mentioned exigency only to note that there was no reason for
the officers not to have obtained a warrant before entering the
premises. 41 These statements, however, have furnished lower
courts with an implied basis for viewing prevention of destruc-
tion of evidence as an exception to the warrant requirement. 42
38. McDonald, 335 U.S. at 455. Despite the language to the contrary in John-
son, the Court's language in McDonald referring to Johnson implies that it recog-
nized some danger to the evidence there.
39. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 15; McDonald, 335 U.S. at 453. Search incident to a
lawful arrest is an exception to the warrant requirement that permits a warrant-
less search of an arrestee's person and the area within his immediate control at the
time of custodial arrest. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Such searches
are lawful if the arrest is lawful and the search is conducted close to the time of the
arrestee's arrest and does not exceed the permissible area. Reason to believe evi-
dence of criminal activity is present is not necessary. United States v. Robinson,
414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973). The search is permitted to prevent the arrestee from
using any weapons he may have and to prevent him from destroying any evidence
within his reach. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763.
40. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 16-17; McDonald, 335 U.S. at 453-54.
41. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 15; McDonald, 335 U.S. at 454-55.
42. At least 40 state and federal courts have relied on that language. See, e.g.,
United States v. Driver, 776 F.2d 807, 810 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Dart,
747 F.2d 263, 267 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Palumbo, 742 F.2d 656, 658-59
(1st Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1114 (1985); United States v. Thompson, 700
F.2d 944, 947-48 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Vasquez, 638 F.2d 507, 530 (2d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 975 (1981); United States v. Guidry, 534 F.2d
1997]
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B. Imminent Destruction of Evidence as Justification for
Warrantless Action
Schmerber v. California43 is the only case in which the
Supreme Court has approved the admission of evidence seized
without a search warrant on the ground that otherwise the evi-
dence would have been destroyed." Schmerber was convicted of
driving under the influence of alcohol based upon a blood sam-
ple taken by a doctor on instruction from the police, without a
warrant and over the defendant's objection. 45 The Court held
that the imminent destruction of evidence constituted an emer-
gency that justified the warrantless action. The Court reasoned
that because the percentage of alcohol in blood diminishes
shortly after one stops consuming alcohol, such "special facts"
justified the search as an "appropriate incident to [Schmerber's]
arrest."46
The rationale for the decision, however, is not entirely
clear. Was the evanescent nature of the evidence the key fact
permitting seizure without a warrant? Or does the word "inci-
dent" suggest that the search was justified under the more
traditional search-incident-to-arrest exception, with the Court's
1220, 1223 (6th Cir. 1976); Guzman v. Estelle, 493 F.2d 532, 536-37 (5th Cir.
1974); United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262, 268 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
833 (1973); Leahy v. United States, 272 F.2d 487, 491 n.5 (9th Cir. 1960); Fluker v.
State, 171 Ga. App. 415, 416-17, 319 S.E.2d 884, 866 (1984); Sayre v. State, 471
N.E.2d 708, 714 (Ind. App. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1226 (1986); Stackhouse
v. State, 298 Md. 203, 209, 468 A.2d 333, 342 (1983); Commonwealth v. Skea, 18
Mass. App. 685, 700, 470 N.E.2d 385, 391 (1984); State v. Peters, 695 S.W.2d 140,
147 (Mo. App. 1985); State v. Welker, 37 Wash. App. 628, 632-34, 683 P.2d 1110,
1114-15 (1984).
43. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
44. A similar result was reached by the Court three years prior to Schmerber
in Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963). In Ker, however, the Court's focus was on
the failure of police to comply with Cal. Penal Code § 844, which permitted peace
officers to enter a dwelling to make an arrest on reasonable cause following a de-
mand for admittance and an explanation of the purpose for which admittance was
desired. Although Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) subsequently deter-
mined that warrantless, nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home to make a rou-
tine felony arrest was violative of the fourth amendment, at the time Ker was
decided, police only needed probable cause to arrest, and thus when the officers in
Ker entered the defendant's apartment without a warrant and unannounced in
order to prevent the destruction of evidence, there was arguably a lesser fourth
amendment intrusion than in Schmerber.
45. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 758.
46. Id. at 770-71.
[Tribute
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recognition of the ephemeral nature of the evidence merely war-
ranting the particularly intrusive search of the suspect's body?
Although the answer to this question is not clear, the Court
later cites Schmerber as an exigent circumstance case rather
than one involving a search incident to an arrest.47 Schmerber
was unique, however; the special nature of the intrusion into
Schmerber's body was noted by the Court when it refused to
rely on prior decisions that involved state interference with
property relationships. 48 Moreover, in Schmerber, the evidence
was actually being destroyed, a process that could not have
been interrupted by the police. Finally, the officers could not
have foreseen the emergency and obtained a warrant. Thus,
Schmerber may have limited application to a warrantless
search of premises.
C. The Prototypical Case: Vale v. Louisiana
Vale v. Louisiana49 is the case most often cited both for and
against the admissibility of evidence seized from a residence
without a warrant in order to prevent destruction of the evi-
dence. In Vale, police with warrants for Vale's arrest staked out
his residence. After observing an apparent drug transaction,
the police arrested Vale in front of the house and informed him
of their intention to search it. When they entered the house
with Vale, one of the officers made a cursory inspection of the
premises and ascertained that no one else was present. Min-
47. See, e.g., Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759 (1985) (compelled surgical pro-
cedure to remove bullet from suspect's chest held to constitute unreasonable
search under fourth amendment); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750 (1984)
(absent exigent circumstances, warrantless nighttime entry into individual's home
to make arrest for civil, nonjailable traffic offense held prohibited by fourth amend-
ment); Vasquez v. United States, 454 U.S. 975, 988 (1981) (warrantless entry into
individual's apartment to make cursory inspection of premises held justified to
guarantee evidence was not being destroyed); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394
(1978) (state statute permitting warrantless search of individual's apartment sim-
ply because a homicide had occurred there held inconsistent with fourth and four-
teenth amendments); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 4 (1973) (compelling
witness to furnish voice exemplar held not to violate fourth amendment).
48. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768-69. The Court stated, "[because we are deal-
ing with intrusions into the human body rather than with state interferences with
property relationships or private papers-houses, papers, and effects-we write on
a clean slate. Limitations on [searches of property] are not instructive in this con-
text." Id. at 767-68.
49. 399 U.S. 30 (1970).
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utes later, Vale's mother and brother arrived. The officers then
searched the house and discovered narcotics in a rear
bedroom. 50
The Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the search, noting
the ready destructibility of narcotics and the possibility that
other persons may have been on the premises who could have
destroyed the evidence.51 The United States Supreme Court re-
versed, concluding that no exigent circumstances justified the
warrantless action.
The decision in Vale is confusing for two reasons. First, in
rejecting the contention that an emergency existed, the Court
observed in a single sentence that "[tihe goods ultimately seized
were not in the process of destruction."52 This language sug-
gests that warrantless action would be permitted only when the
evidence is actually being destroyed. It is the Court's most
widely cited statement governing warrantless action to preserve
evidence, 53 but the standard is so restrictive it can rarely be
met. Testimony that the police heard toilets being flushed or
saw suspects burning evidence could meet the standard, but it
seems unlikely that such a showing could be made in many in-
stances. The circuit courts have assumed that the Supreme
Court did not intend that its language be taken literally,54 and
50. Id. at 33.
51. The Louisiana Supreme Court had also upheld the search on the ground,
not relevant to this discussion, that the search was sustainable as a permissible
search incident to Vale's arrest although the arrest occurred outside the house.
The United States Supreme Court quickly rejected this branch of the holding, cit-
ing traditional limits to the search incident to arrest doctrine. Id. at 33-34.
52. Id. at 35.
53. Harbaugh & Faust, "Knock on Any Door--Home Arrests After Payton and
Steagald, 86 DICK. L. REV. 191, 223 n.208 (1982); see, e.g., United States v. Kun-
kler, 679 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1982); People v. Medina, 7 Cal. 3d 30, 38, 496 P.2d 433,
438, 101 Cal. Rptr. 521, 526 (1972); People v. Larry A., 154 Cal. App. 3d 929, 936
n.5, 201 Cal. Rptr. 696, 701 n.5 (1984); People v. Davis, 86 Ill. App. 3d 557, 562,
407 N.E.2d 1109, 1114 (1980); State v. Nine, 315 So. 2d 667, 673 (La. 1975); State
v. Wiley, 522 S.W.2d 281, 290 (Mo. 1975); State v. Weible, 211 Neb. 174, 180, 317
N.W.2d 920, 924 (1982); State v. Seiss, 168 N.J. Super. 269, 277, 402 A.2d 972, 976
(1979); Lugar v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 609, 629, 202 S.E.2d 894, 909 (1974).
54. In United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
833 (1973), for example, the Third Circuit panel noted:
Although the court had always spoken of "threatened" destruction or re-
moval of evidence in previous cases involving the emergency exception, in
Vale, it spoke for the first time of goods "in the process of destruction."
Although the language might suggest that the emergency exception must be
[Tribute
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have refused to restrict warrantless intrusions to situations in-
volving actual and ongoing destruction of evidence. 55 The prin-
cipal result of this ambiguity has been the formulation of
alternative and varying standards by the circuit courts, which
will be discussed in section II.56
Second, the Court's failure specifically to address the pro-
priety of the police entry into Vale's house has contributed to
the confusion.57 The police activity in Vale had two distinct
components. One, the police entered the house without a search
warrant and passed through the rooms to ascertain whether
other persons were present.58 Two, the police conducted a
search only after Vale's family returned home. 59 Rejecting the
construed to require knowledge that the evidence is actually being removed
or destroyed, the omission of a single word should not be given such signifi-
cance, especially in light of the facts in Vale.
Id. at 267 (citations omitted); see also United States v. Turner, 650 F.2d 526, 529
(4th Cir. 1981) (where officers reasonably believed that evidence might be de-
stroyed before search warrant can be acquired, Vale does not require suppression
of evidence); United States v. Rosselli, 506 F.2d 647, 630 (7th Cir. 1974) (govern-
ment's burden does not require proof of actual knowledge that evidence is being
destroyed); United States v. Blake, 484 F.2d 50, 54-55 (8th Cir. 1973) (explaining
how Vale does not alter the rule that evidence threatened with imminent removal
or destruction provides exceptional circumstances justifying warrantless search),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 949 (1974). Commentators have taken the view that the
language should be accepted literally and have viewed Vale as an example of the
traditional special protection afforded dwellings. See White, The Fourth Amend-
ment As a Way of Talking About People; A Study of Robinson and Matlock, 1974
SuP. CT. REv. 165, 183 n.41; Note, Police Practices and the Threatened Destruction
of Tangible Evidence, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1465, 1473 (1971).
55. See cases cited infra note 77.
56. See infra notes 76-194 and accompanying text.
57. Since there was no evidence discovered during the initial search through
the premises and the evidence suppressed was discovered during a later and more
intensive search, it is possible that the Court approved the initial entry. It is un-
clear whether the Court considered the propriety of the entry in deciding the case.
2 W.- LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 654 (1987); Dressier, A Lesson In Caution,
Overwork, and Fatigue: The Judicial Miscraftsmanship of Segura v. United States,
26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 375, 393 n.88 (1985).
58. Vale, 399 U.S. at 33.
59. Id. This knowledge may be more important in Vale than the presence of a
suspect's innocent relatives might be in a different case. According to some com-
mentators, James Vale was not only the defendant's brother, but also was thought
to be a confederate in the drug enterprise. Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and
the Fourth Amendment: The Limits of Lawyering, 48 IND. L.J. 329, 359 (1973);
Kelder & Statman, The Protective Sweep Doctrine: Recurrent Questions Regarding
the Propriety of Searches Conducted Contemporaneously With an Arrest On or
Near Private Premises, 30 SYRACUSE L. REV. 973, 997 n.67 (1979).
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Louisiana court's argument that a confederate capable of de-
stroying evidence could have been in the house, the Court noted
that the police knew that no one else was present when they
completed their initial sweep.60 This statement suggests that
the illegal conduct occurred only after they completed their ini-
tial pass through the house. Thus, the Court may have tacitly
viewed the initial entry and limited search as justified in the
circumstances. 61 Vale can thus be cited for two different pro-
60. Vale, 399 U.S. at 34.
61. At least two commentators have so read Vale. See Dressier, supra note 57,
at 375, 393 n.88; Kelder and Statman, supra note 59, at 973, 997 n.68. Without
specifically relying on Vale, the circuit courts do permit a limited search, often
called a "protective sweep" or "security check" to search for confederates who might
endanger the officers or destroy evidence. The distinctive feature of such a search
is that it is designed to discover persons, not evidence, even though evidence is
often discovered in plain view during such a search. See, e.g., United States v.
Picariello, 568 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1978) (agents justified in securing defendant's
apartment in view of evidence that defendant was involved in bombings and that
stolen explosives were stored in defendant's apartment); United States v. Artierio,
491 F.2d 440 (2d Cir.) (agents entering defendant's home complied with spirit of
statute authorizing officer to break open door to execute search warrant and did
not violate fourth amendment or statute) (dictum), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 878
(1974); United States v. Christophe, 470 F.2d 865, 869 (2d Cir. 1972) (agents secur-
ing premises after arresting defendant entitled to conduct cursory examination of
premises), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 964 (1973).
Occasionally the search may occur, as in Vale, after an arrest outside of a resi-
dence and involve subsequent entry into a residence. See, e.g., United States v.
Baker, 577 F.2d 1147 (4th Cir.) (search of house in front of which defendant was
arrested not invalid where officers reasonably feared they would be fired on by
accomplice inside the house), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 850 (1978); United States v.
Bowdach, 561 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1977) (following shoot-out between defendant
and police, officers had right to conduct quick and cursory check of residence when
they had reasonable grounds to believe that there were others present who might
endanger safety of themselves and others); United States v. James, 528 F.2d 999
(5th Cir.) (officers' entry after shoot-out with occupants and seizure of evidence in
plain view not an unreasonable search and seizure), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 959
(1976). In such an instance, the search, if undertaken to protect evidence, is an
example of a warrantless search of a residence to protect evidence from destruc-
tion. No separate categorization is appropriate, nor should there be a reduced jus-
tification for entry. Yet a number of courts do permit an entry based on no
showing at all for what they call a "protective sweep." See, e.g., United States v.
Miller, 449 F.2d 974 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (officers' entry in hot pursuit of armed felon
justified search and seizure to assure no dangerous persons were hiding); United
States v. Briddle, 436 F.2d 4 (8th Cir. 1970) (evidence in plain view during officers'
quick search of apartment in which defendant was arrested was not fruit of unlaw-
fil search and seizure), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 921 (1971); United States v. Cognato,
408 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Conn.) (once officers gained lawful entry into apartment,
they had right to arrest defendant, seize evidence from his person, inspect prem-
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol17/iss3/15
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positions: (1) Vale may prohibit a warrantless search of a dwell-
ing even when it is known that persons who might destroy
evidence are present, unless the evidence is known to be in the
process of destruction; or (2) Vale may permit a warrantless en-
try into premises after a lawful arrest outside the premises, on
no showing at all, in order to check for confederates or persons
who might destroy evidence.
The first proposition is so restrictive that officers can virtu-
ally never make a warrantless entry to prevent the loss of evi-
dence. Normally, they will be unable to determine from the
outside what is actually happening on the inside. The second
proposition may be unduly permissive, because the mere arrest
of a resident would authorize a warrantless entry to discover
persons who might destroy evidence. Such conflicting interpre-
tations have been responsible for much of the confusion in this
area. Vale can be cited in virtually every case in which one
wishes to argue that threatened destruction of evidence justifies
a warrantless entry, and its ambiguities frequently allow it to
be cited by both sides.
ises, and seize other evidence in plain view), affd, 539 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 956 (1977).
More frequently, a protective sweep is a search through the rooms of a resi-
dence after an otherwise lawful entry to assure the officers that they are not in
danger from others. See e.g., United States v. Mabry, 809 F.2d 671 (10th Cir.
1987) (limited protective sweep to secure premises and ascertain whether there
were persons other than defendants on premises who might pose danger to officers
was justified by exigent circumstances); United States v. Escobar, 805 F.2d 68 (2d
Cir. 1986) (officers may conduct security check without warrant when making
arrest on private premises when they reasonably fear that there are other persons
within who may pose threat or are likely to destroy evidence); United States v.
Newton, 788 F.2d 1392 (8th Cir. 1986) (officers justified in conducting protective
search for a man they thought was inside house and who might have been cause of
another's death); United States v. Gardner, 627 F.2d 906 (9th Cir. 1980) (9th Cir.
1980) (where officers had a reasonable apprehension concerning unknown and pos-
sibly dangerous occupants of residence, warrantless protective sweep did not vio-
late fourth amendment); United States v. Cravero, 545 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1976)
(officers who entered premises of third party to execute arrest warrants and who,
after arresting defendants, heard scuffling sounds coming from bathroom were jus-
tified in making a cursory search to secure immediate area), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
983 (1977). A search undertaken after the officers are already inside is more accu-
rately considered as a search-incident rubric and is outside the scope of this Arti-
cle. For a more complete examination of the protective sweep doctrine, see Kelder
& Statman, supra note 59.
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D. A New Factor Emerges: Gravity of the Offense
Since Vale, the Court has offered further guidance for de-
termining the appropriateness of a warrantless intrusion in
only one case. In Welsh v. Wisconsin,62 the Court reversed a
conviction for driving while intoxicated. After driving his car off
the road and abandoning it, Welsh walked to his home and
went to bed. Police, on information from a witness who had
seen Welsh driving his car erratically, went to his home, en-
tered without a warrant, and arrested him. The prosecution ar-
gued that the warrantless entry to arrest was necessary to
prevent the destruction of evidence. 68 Here, as in Schmerber,
the evidence in danger of destruction was the level of alcohol in
the blood. The Court rejected that argument and reaffirmed the
special protections afforded the home, noting that it had never
actually permitted a warrantless entry of a home except in hot
pursuit.64 Notwithstanding the fact that the alcohol in the de-
fendant's blood was being destroyed, the Court held that exi-
gent circumstances did not justify the warrantless entry.65 The
Court noted that hesitancy "in finding exigent circumstances,
especially when warrantless arrests in the home are at issue, is
particularly appropriate when the underlying offense for which
there is probable cause to arrest is relatively minor."66
The gravity of the offense as a determinant of an emergency
is a new consideration in exigent circumstances analysis.
Although the Court does not reject the notion that exigent cir-
cumstances may justify a warrantless entry into the home,
Welsh offers more support for a limited reading of that proposi-
tion than for the expansive view accepted by many of the
circuits. 67
62. 466 U.S. 740 (1984).
63. In Welsh, the Court also addressed the government's other contentions
that "hot pursuit" of the suspect and prevention of physical harm to the suspect
and the public justified the warrantless entry into the suspect's home, id. at 753,
but the Court found the government's "hot pursuit" claim "unconvincing" based on
the lack of "immediate or continuous pursuit" of the suspect from the crime scene.
Id. Similarly, it rejected the government's public safety claim because the suspect
had already abandoned his car and was in his home. Id.
64. Id. at 750.
65. Id. at 754.
66. Id. at 750.
67. See infra notes 134-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ap-
proaches adopted by the District of Columbia, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits.
[Tribute
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E. The Justices' Diverging Views
The Court's denial of certiorari in Vasquez v. United
States68 produced supporting and dissenting opinions discuss-
ing destruction of evidence as an exception to the warrant re-
quirement. 69 Vasquez arose out of the investigation of a cocaine
distribution ring, some of whose members were arrested outside
an apartment building believed to contain drugs. One of the ar-
restees told the police that they had come from an apartment on
the second floor. The police went to a second-floor apartment,
were admitted, and after the occupant of the apartment created
a commotion that could have been heard by anyone remaining
in the building, were informed that the persons arrested outside
the building had been in and out of a fourth-floor apartment
throughout the day.
The officers decided to enter the fourth-floor apartment,
fearing that confederates might be in the apartment destroying
evidence. Their belief was based on the fact that one of the ar-
restees was lightly clad and keyless, from which the officers in-
ferred that someone remained in the apartment to readmit him,
and that the arrests outside the building and the disturbance
following the investigation at the second-floor apartment proba-
bly would have alerted any remaining confederates to the pres-
ence of police. After entry, the police seized items in plain view
and items discovered after a more extensive search, although no
one else was in the apartment. 70 The circuit court affirmed the
district court's decision to admit only the plain-view evidence. 71
The Supreme Court denied certiorari. Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and White dissented because they believed the circuit
court had applied a "security check" exception to the warrant
requirement, an exception not yet recognized by the Court. 72
68. 454 U.S. 975 (1981).
69. The opinion in support of the denial of certiorari was authored by Justice
Stevens, id., and the opinion in opposition to the denial of certiorari was authored
by Justice Brennan and joined by Justices Marshall and White. Id. at 983.
70. Id. at 979.
71. Id. at 980-82.
72. In his dissent, Justice Brennan stated:
[Tihe Court of Appeals purported to identify and apply a "security check"
exception to the warrant requirement which ... would allow warrantless
entry into a home following an arrest outside, if the arresting officers pos-
sess a reasonable belief that third persons are inside and aware of the
1997]
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Justice Brennan argued that the Court's decisions do not sup-
port such an exception:
[T]he Constitution has never been construed by this Court to al-
low the police, in the absence of an emergency, to arrest a person
outside his home and then take him inside for the purpose of con-
ducting a warrantless search .... Indeed, our precedents can
more reasonably be read as interpreting the Fourth Amendment
to bar the warrantless entry of a residence predicated solely on
the belief that persons on the premises, knowing of the arrest,
might destroy evidence. 73
Justice Stevens, who supported denial of certiorari, did not
dispute the dissenting Justices' view that a security check ex-
ception to prevent the destruction of evidence had never been
sanctioned by the Court, but denied certiorari on other grounds,
including the possibility that the circuit courts agreed on the
issue.74 As will be seen in section II, any agreement among the
circuits is only superficial. If a majority of the Court shares this
opinion it may explain the Court's reluctance to consider the
question. 75 Although the Supreme Court traditionally has
viewed destruction of evidence as an exigent circumstance that
may justify warrantless action, it has thus failed to provide a
principled basis for determining when, or under what circum-
arrest, "so that they might destroy evidence.. . ." The exception thus stated
not only authorizes the police to enter a home without a warrant in circum-
stances far less compelling than we have recognized, but permits law of-
ficers, in determining the time and manner of executing an arrest, to
contrive their own exigency and thereby avoid the necessity of procuring a
warrant before entering the home.
Id. at 983. "Despite the currency of the doctrine in the lower courts, no decision of
this Court supports the existence of a general 'security check' exception to the war-
rant requirement." Id. at 987.
73. Id. at 987-88 (quoting Shipley v. California, 395 U.S. 818, 820 (1969) and
citing Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970)).
74. Justice Stevens notes that Justice Brennan "correctly points out that
there are substantial arguments favoring a grant of certiorari." Id. at 976. Since
Justice Brennan's only argument is that the security check exception to prevent
the destruction of evidence relied upon by the Second Circuit has not been sanc-
tioned by the Court, it is not unfair to assume that Stevens is not convinced of its
appropriateness himself. Rather he bases his decision to deny certiorari on the
possible lack of standing of the defendant, the limited, narrow holding of the court
below, and the assertion that there was no allegation in the petition for certiorari
that there is a conflict between the decision of the court of appeals in this case and
any other court of appeals decision. Id. at 976-77.
75. See supra note 25.
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stances, evidence is sufficiently threatened with destruction to
justify a warrantless entry. Vale, the leading case on entries
into residences to prevent loss of evidence, produces confusion
rather than illumination. The only instance when evidence was
properly seized without a warrant to prevent its destruction
was in Schmerber, in which the evidence was actually in the
process of destruction and the seizure did not require entry into
a home. When entry into a home is at issue, the gravity of the
offense may determine whether the exigency is sufficiently
pressing to justify crossing the threshold without a warrant,
even when evidence is in the process of destruction. Finally, at
least three Justices of the Court believe it is time for reconsider-
ation of the matter. A close examination of the situation as seen
by the circuit courts may persuade the remainder.
II. The Circuit Courts' View of Destruction of Evidence as a
Justification for Warrantless Searches
The circuit courts are in disarray on the justification neces-
sary to permit warrantless actions to prevent destruction of evi-
dence. Although all recognize that potential destruction of
evidence may justify warrantless action, 76 and although none
limit such action, as suggested in Vale, to instances in which
evidence is in the process of destruction, 77 their approaches are
76. See, e.g., United States v. Andersson, 813 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Altman, 797 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Baldacchino, 762 F.2d 170 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Garcia, 741 F.2d 363
(11th Cir. 1984); United States v. Thompson, 700 F.2d 944 (5th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Cuaron, 700 F.2d 582 (10th Cir. 1983); United States v. Eddy, 660 F.2d
381 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. Turner, 650 F.2d 526 (4th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Allison, 639 F.2d 792 (D.C. Cir. 1980); United States v. Renfro, 620 F.2d
569 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 902 (1980); United States V. Vasquez, 638
F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 975 (1981); United States v. Rubin,
474 F.2d 262 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 833 (1973).
77. See, e.g., United States v. Gallo-Roman, 816 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1987); United
States v. Andersson, 813 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Mabry, 809
F.2d 671 (10th Cir. 1987); United States v. Altman, 797 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Moore, 790 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1986); United States v. Webster, 750
F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1106 (1985); United States v. Gar-
cia, 741 F.2d 363 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. Palumbo, 735 F.2d 1095 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 934 (1984); United States v. Elkins, 732 F.2d 1280 (6th
Cir. 1984); United States v. Turner, 650 F.2d 526 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Kane, 637 F.2d 974 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Allison, 639 F.2d 792 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
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otherwise varied. Some circuits require the presence of specific
factors. For example, the Third and Fourth Circuits use a five-
factor test to determine whether warrantless action is justi-
fied. 78 Other circuits have rejected a checklist approach for de-
termining when exigent circumstances exist, instead looking to
the totality of the circumstances in each case. 79 The differences
among these formulations themselves are not necessarily im-
portant. The important constitutional consideration is whether
cases decided under these tests produce different results, be-
cause if they do, an individual in one part of the country will
enjoy more protection from government intrusions than an indi-
vidual in another part of the country, a result that is
unacceptable.
It is difficult to categorize and compare the approaches
taken by the circuits. 80 Some have never articulated a specific
test or mode of analysis, while others have offered more than
one formulation.8 1 Additionally, even among those circuits that
78. See United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262, 268-69 (3d Cir. 1973).
79. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 602 F.2d 458, 470 (1st Cir. 1979);
United States v. Flickenger, 573 F.2d 1349, 1356 (9th Cir. 1978).
80. Other commentators created categories for evaluating exigent circum-
stances justifying warrantless entries into the home for the purpose of arrest. See
Donnino & Girese, Exigent Circumstances for a Warrantless Home Arrest, 45 ALB.
L. REV. 90 (1980); Harbaugh & Faust, supra note 53. Both of these efforts, how-
ever, concentrated on the way in which the reviewing court has organized its focus
for determining the presence or absence of exigent circumstances. Neither ex-
amined the factors that courts have actually considered relevant when determin-
ing the presence or absence of exigent circumstances. Donnino and Girese divided
the courts into three groups. The first, called "qualitative," is defined by the au-
thors as an attempt to "reduce the constellation of facts believed relevant to finding
exigent circumstances into a set of enumerated factors that appear to be both all-
encompassing and easy of application." Donnino & Girese, supra, at 99. The sec-
ond approach, designated the "definitional" approach, was thought to be similar to
the first, but "rather than an enumerated list of factors, the enunciating court at-
tempts to utilize a comprehensive definition, indicating what considerations are
important to the issue." Id. at 106. The third approach, designated "holistic,"
neither employed enumerated factors nor formed an all-encompassing definition,
but left the question to be resolved on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 109. Harbaugh
and Faust, on the other hand, took a simpler approach and divided the courts into
two categories, the checklist standard or the totality of the circumstances test.
Harbaugh & Faust, supra note 53, at 224. Although possibly instructive in com-
paring what the courts say when deciding on the presence or absence of exigent
circumstances, these methods are not helpful in evaluating what results a court
would reach in a given situation.
81. See infra text accompanying notes 134-44, showing that the Sixth, Eighth,
and District of Columbia Circuits have not created specific tests; see also infra text
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have set up a specific test, typically worded as "reason to believe
that evidence is threatened with imminent destruction," 2 the
results are often different, and among the circuits that employ
different-sounding tests the results are often the same. Need-
less to say, merely comparing the way the courts formulate the
various tests is unsatisfactory. The results reached in similar
factual circumstances must also be considered.
Two considerations are relevant in determining whether an
emergency endangering evidence exists. The first is the nature
of the threat, whether it is genuine and imminent or merely
speculative. The second is whether the threat, although genu-
ine, was foreseeable or otherwise avoidable. If the emergency
was foreseeable, a warrant could have been obtained; and if it
was avoidable, the government should not be able to benefit
from the exigency.
How critically courts evaluate the claim of danger directly
controls the results they reach. Using this analysis as a point of
departure, the circuits can be divided into three groups. The
first group considers both parts of the factual question. These
accompanying notes 89-92, which shows that the First Circuit has stated its test
differently on various occasions.
82. See United States v. Johnson, 802 F.2d 1459, 1461 (D.C. 1986) ("The test
for exigent circumstances is whether police had 'an urgent need' or 'an immediate
major crisis in the performance of duty afford[ing] neither time nor opportunity to
apply to a magistrate.' "); United States v. A1-Azzawy, 784 F.2d 890, 894 (9th Cir.
1985) ("The Ninth Circuit has defined exigent circumstances as 'those in which a
substantial risk of harm to the persons involved or to the law enforcement process
would arise if the police were to delay a search [or arrest] until a warrant could be
obtained.' "); United States v. Farra, 725 F.2d 197, 199 (2d Cir. 1984) (Exigent
circumstances existed where "there was a substantial risk that evidence would be
removed or destroyed and that innocent [people] would be harmed or significantly
inconvenienced."); United States v. Thompson, 700 F.2d 944, 947-48 (5th Cir.
1983) ("To prevail on [the exigent circumstances] exception, the government must
demonstrate that the agents had reason to believe that the evidence was in danger
of imminent destruction."), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2255 (1986); United States v.
Cuaron, 700 F.2d 582, 586 (10th Cir. 1983) ("When officers have reason to believe
that criminal evidence may be destroyed... or removed ... before a warrant can
be obtained."); United States v. Edwards, 602 F.2d 458, 468 (1st Cir. 1979) ("[Tlhe
possibility that evidence will be destroyed ... has been recognized as a sufficient
exigency to justify warrantless entry."); United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262, 268
(3d Cir.) ("When Government agents.., have probable cause to believe contraband
is present and, in addition, based on the surrounding circumstances or the infor-
mation at hand, they reasonably conclude that the evidence will be destroyed or
removed before they can secure a search warrant, a warrantless search is justi-
fied."), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 833 (1973).
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courts require: (1) an objectively verifiable factual showing of an
emergency, and (2) that police obtain a warrant if possible,
thereby obviating the need for warrantless action. This is the
"examine-avoid" approach. At the other end of the spectrum,
the courts of the second group do not carefully scrutinize the
police claim that an emergency exists or consider whether it
would have been possible to obtain a warrant and avoid war-
rantless action. This group uses the "uncritical" approach. The
third group is in the middle. These courts require a verifiable
factual showing of emergency, and usually consider whether a
warrant could have been acquired before the warrantless intru-
sion occurred, as do the courts in the first group. In contrast,
however, this group does not require that police avoid the need
for warrantless action by planning ahead. This group exempli-
fies an "examine-only" approach. Obviously, the same case may
be decided differently, depending on the circuit that happens to
consider it.
A. The Examine-Avoid Approach
The first group is composed of the First, Third, and Fourth
Circuits, and is the most protective of fourth amendment val-
ues. This group also places the heaviest restrictions on police
action. These courts require the police to have factual informa-
tion that justifies the conclusion that an emergency exists. An
unsupported belief that an emergency exists or a belief based on
surmise or conjecture is not enough.8 3 These courts demand ob-
jective facts that permit a reviewing court to evaluate the ap-
propriateness of the warrantless intrusion. They also require
police to obtain a warrant if it is possible to do so, viewing the
ability to secure a warrant before the danger of destruction ever
arises as vitiating a claim of emergency. 4 Although police are
not required to secure a warrant at the first possible moment,
warrantless action occurring a reasonable time after police have
probable cause and are able to seek a warrant is suspect, re-
quiring at least an explanation for the failure to obtain one. 85
In this way, these courts refuse to allow lack of police prepara-
tion to justify warrantless action.
83. See infra text accompanying notes 117-24.
84. See infra text accompanying notes 99-109, 125-28.
85. See infra notes 103-04, 126 and accompanying text.
[Tribute
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These courts require police to plan ahead and to avoid ac-
tion that may create the situation later claimed to be an emer-
gency, because they recognize that some circumstances that
might otherwise justify warrantless action are foreseeable. 86
For example, this group would prohibit police from engineering
an arrest of a suspect on the street outside his home, knowing
that people are inside who might destroy evidence, and then
basing a claim of emergency on circumstances created by the
arrest. Even though the subsequent emergency may be real,
the need to act without a warrant could have been avoided by
arresting the suspect outside the view of individuals in the resi-
dence or by obtaining a warrant before making the arrest.
Reciting the general nature of the examine-avoid approach
perhaps masks the fact that this group also exemplifies how
courts can articulate their tests differently yet reach the same
results. As will be shown in this section, the First Circuit's ar-
ticulation of its test appears quite different from those of the
Third and Fourth Circuits. Despite their semantic differences,
all three evaluate the facts underlying the claim of emergency
similarly.
(1) The First Circuit's Test
The First Circuit has articulated different standards for
evaluating the government's use of warrantless activity to pre-
vent the destruction of evidence. In 1985, the court stated:
In determining whether the circumstances of a case fall into
one of the emergency conditions characterized as exigent circum-
stances, the court must consider: the gravity of the underlying of-
fense; whether delay poses a threat to police or the public safety;
the likelihood that the suspect will escape if not quickly appre-
hended; and whether there is a great likelihood that evidence will
be destroyed if the arrest is delayed until a warrant can be
obtained.8 7
Only a year later, the court stated: "A number of courts,
including our own, have held that such exigent circumstances
exist when government agents reasonably believe that evidence
will be destroyed or a suspect will flee if an immediate entry is
86. See infra notes 99-109 and accompanying text.
87. United States v. Baldacchino, 762 F.2d 170, 176 (1st Cir. 1985).
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not made."88 The earlier formulation is far more specific than
the general proposition more recently stated. 9 The court has
not made clear whether it has intentionally abandoned the first
test in favor of the new test. Prior to these cases, the court had
expressed itself in at least two other ways.90
Notwithstanding the somewhat different articulations of its
test, an evaluation of the decisions indicates a consistent ap-
proach. In practice, the court conducts a three-part inquiry: (1)
whether there are objective facts to support the claim that the
evidence in question was in danger of destruction or removal;
(2) whether police could have obviated the need for warrantless
action by taking an alternate course; and (3) whether police
adopted the least restrictive intrusion permitted by the
circumstances.
88. United States v. Moore, 790 F.2d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1986).
89. This approach closely resembles the checklist approach of United States v.
Dorman, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The District of Columbia Circuit created
one of the tests frequently cited by other circuits and by the Supreme Court in
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 751-52 (1984), for evaluating the presence of an
exigency. Destruction of evidence was not at issue in the case in which the test
was developed. In Dorman, the court considered whether an arrest warrant was
required before the police could enter private premises to make a routine felony
arrest. The court concluded that a warrant was required. The court then consid-
ered whether there were exigent circumstances that excused the police from get-
ting a warrant. The court then listed seven factors that, although not exclusive,
were relevant to determining whether an exigency existed. These factors include
whether: (1) a grave offense is involved, particularly one that is a crime of violence;
(2) the suspect is reasonably believed to be armed; (3) probable cause clearly exists
beyond a mere minimum showing; (4) existence of a strong reason to believe that
the suspect is in the premises being entered; (5) a likelihood that the suspect will
escape if not swiftly apprehended; (6) the circumstance that the entry, though not
consented to, is made peaceably; and finally (7) which the court says works in more
than one direction, whether the entry was made at night. Dorman, 435 F.2d at
392-93. Although some of these factors, may be helpful in evaluating the presence
or absence of an emergency involving the possible destruction of evidence, quite
obviously some of the factors are completely irrelevant.
90. See, e.g., United States v. Palumbo, 742 F.2d 656, 658 (1st Cir. 1984) ("im-
minent destruction, removal, or concealment of the [evidence] to be seized may...
justify warrantless entry into a dwelling"), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1114 (1985);
United States v. Adams, 621 F.2d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 1980) ("whether there is such a
compelling necessity for immediate action as will not brook the delay of obtaining a
warrant"). Although these two statements by the court do not represent different
"tests," they do exemplify the absence of a particular formulation affirmatively
adopted by the court and consistently applied.
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United States v. Palumbo9' exemplifies the First Circuit's
analysis. After Palumbo's arrest away from his home for selling
narcotics, government agents sought a search warrant for the
Palumbo home.92 The police decided to "secure"93 the house
pending application for the warrant, because a government
computer indicated that the defendant's wife was rumored to be
in the drug business with her husband.94 An agent feared
Palumbo's failure to return home would alarm his wife and
cause her to destroy any drugs in the house,95 or that she may
have known of Palumbo's arrest directly, because there were
many witnesses to the arrest, and Palumbo was well-known in
the area.96 The court found that the police had insufficient evi-
dence to support their apprehensions 97 and held the warrant-
less entry and occupation of the defendant's home to be illegal.98
In evaluating the need for warrantless action, the First Cir-
cuit consistently considers whether the police could have ob-
tained a warrant or otherwise avoided warrantless action. For
91. 742 F.2d 656 (1st Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1114 (1985).
92. Id. at 658.
93. The court uses the word "secure" and places it in quotations. Id. at 658.
The court was referring to the police officers' arrival at the defendant's home, the
entry of a number of police officers over the objection of defendant's wife, and the
subsequent initial search throughout the Palumbo home. Id. at 658-59.
94. Id. at 658. The use of rumors contained in computerized data bases as
investigatory tools has been noted by Doernberg and Zeigler:
The crime analysis system utilized in Long Beach, California, has gone
one step beyond mere "crime analysis." In addition to moving vehicle cita-
tions and pawnshop loan reports, Long Beach has computerized field inter-
view reports "to document suspicious occurrences for which no criminal
violations can be identified" for use in subsequent investigations. This com-
puterized criminal rumor information system commenced operation in De-
cember 1972.
Doernberg & Zeigler, Due Process Versus Data Processing: An Analysis of Comput-
erized Criminal History Information Systems, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1110, 1175 n.306
(1980).
95. Palumbo, 742 F.2d at 658.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 657. Although the court found the entry and occupancy of the
Palumbo home illegal, no evidence was acquired as a result of the illegal search
since the items later discovered and seized were the result of independent probable
cause and a valid warrant. For other examples of the courts' examination of the
existence of an emergency, see United States v. Moore, 790 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir.
1986); United States v. Edwards, 602 F.2d 458, 468 (1st Cir. 1979).
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example, in Niro v. United States,99 FBI agents had probable
cause to believe that certain evidence was in the defendant's
leased garage as recently as the evening before they took action,
at which time they began to watch the premises. 100 At noon the
following day, two cars believed to belong to the defendant ar-
rived at the building. The agents, seeing trucks in the open
doorway, entered the garage, arrested the occupants and after a
search, seized stolen liquor,10 ' although what prompted them to
act is not clear from the opinion. No warrant had been
sought. 02 Suppressing the evidence, the court noted that
although failure to obtain a warrant is not necessarily fatal to a
search or seizure, when the police previously had probable
cause, at last some countervailing factors, not present in Niro,
were necessary to excuse the failure. 10 3 As the court noted,
[piroceeding without a warrant is not to be justified, as the gov-
ernment suggests here, by the fact that by the time the officers
act, dispatch is necessary to avoid flight or injury to person or
property. Haste does not become necessary in the present sense if
the need for it has been brought about by deliberate and unrea-
sonable delay. This would allow the exception to swallow the
principle. 104
Similarly, in United States v. Adams,'0 5 the police went to
defendant's apartment with probable cause to believe she was
harboring a fugitive. They knocked on the door and were met
by the defendant. The defendant denied that the fugitive as
there, but after a search the fugitive was found in a closet.10 6
The court struck down the search because there was no reason
for the officers not to have obtained a warrant before going to
the apartment. 0 7 The court, however, acknowledged that after
the police knocked on the door, which they did not need a war-
rant to do, there was a reasonable basis for believing that an
99. 388 F.2d 535 (lst Cir. 1968).
100. Id. at 536.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 537.
103. Id. at 539.
104. Id. at 540.
105. 621 F.2d 41 (1st Cir. 1980).
106. Id. at 43.
107. Id. at 44-45.
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emergency existed.108 Thus, in both cases the First Circuit re-
fused to allow an avoidable emergency to justify warrantless
action. 109
The First Circuit further limits warrantless intrusions by
requiring police to adopt the least restrictive intrusion the cir-
cumstances permit. In Palumbo, the court stated:
When... an exigency is found, however, the least restrictive
intrusion is to be adopted, or the whole constitutional require-
ment for obtaining a warrant would be defeated. When it is
known that no one is presently on the premises, they may be se-
cured merely by guarding the entrances. When persons are pres-
ent and such persons may reasonably be feared to pose a
substantial threat to destroy evidence, more intrusive action may
be proper. Even then, the police might be well advised to give the
occupants a choice of exiting the premises. This might be accom-
panied by a very quick and limited pass through the premises to
check for third persons who may destroy evidence.110
Thus, the First Circuit, after carefully considering whether
an emergency exists and evaluating whether the police could
have avoided warrantless action, further requires that the en-
try be no more intrusive than necessary. Typically under this
approach a warrantless entry will be permitted to prevent the
emergency from occurring or to limit its damage. Even after
such an entry, however, a warrant must be acquired before a
full search will be permitted."'
(2) The Third and Fourth Circuit's Test
The Third and Fourth Circuits employ a test created by the
Third Circuit in United States v. Rubin,112 only three years after
108. The fugitive would presumably not remain at the apartment if they left
to get a warrant.
109. See United States v. Edwards, 602 F.2d 458, 468 (1st Cir. 1979) (upheld
the warrantless intrusions only after considering whether a warrant could have
been obtained before the police arrived at the premises and concluding that no
warrant would have issued); United States v. Picariello, 568 F.2d 222, 226 (1st Cir.
1978) (upheld a warrantless intrusion that preceded a search by warrant, after
concluding that the agents acted with all reasonable dispatch in organizing the
information necessary to support a warrant and in obtaining one).
110. Palumbo, 742 F.2d at 659 (citations omitted).
111. United States v. Moore, 790 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 1986); United States v.
Di Gregorio, 605 F.2d 1184, 1187-88 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 937 (1979).
112. 474 F.2d 262 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 833 (1973).
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the Supreme Court's decision in Vale. 113 Rubin picked up a
crate at an airport and took it home. The government knew the
crate contained hashish. The agents sought a search warrant
while keeping the defendant and his home under surveillance.
Before a warrant could be acquired, the defendant drove away
from his home and was arrested. As he was being taken into
custody, the defendant shouted to spectators, "call my brother."
The agents, fearing that someone would do so and thereby en-
danger evidence remaining at the defendant's house, returned
there, arrested the occupants and seized the hashish.1 4
The Third Circuit asked initially whether Vale should be
read literally as requiring evidence to be in the process of de-
struction to justify a warrantless search. 1 5 The court concluded
that the language in Vale should not be read literally because it
was not intended as a new standard but rather as a finding of
no emergency on the facts of that case.1 6 The Rubin court after
explaining the possible standards for judging warrantless
searches under emergency circumstances, announced the fol-
lowing general rule: "When Government agents.., have prob-
able cause to believe contraband is present and, in addition,
based on the surrounding circumstances or the information at
hand, they reasonably conclude that the evidence will be de-
stroyed or removed before they can secure a search warrant, a
warrantless search is justified.""17 After noting that circum-
stances vary from case to case, the court went on to list those
that it considered relevant:
(1) the degree of urgency involved and the amount of time
necessary to obtain a warrant;
(2) reasonable belief that the contraband is about to be
removed;
(3) the possibility of danger to police officers guarding the site
of the contraband while a search warrant is sought;
(4) information indicating the possessors of the contraband
are aware that the police are on their trail; and
113. 399 U.S. 30 (1970). The Fourth Circuit case adopting the Rubin test is
United States v. Turner, 650 F.2d 526, 528 (4th Cir. 1981).
114. Rubin, 474 F.2d at 264.
115. Id. at 267.
116. Id. at 267-68.
117. Id.
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(5) the ready destructibility of the contraband and the knowl-
edge that efforts to dispose of narcotics and to escape are charac-
teristic behavior of persons engaged in the narcotics traffic.' 18
The Rubin factors represent a very similar test to the
three-part inquiry used by the First Circuit. 1 9 Initially, the
First Circuit asks whether a genuine emergency exists: whether
there are facts supporting the police claim of exigency. 120 The
second, 12' fourth, 122 and fifth 23 Rubin factors address the same
question. Each factor involves an evaluation of the genuineness
of the emergency and corresponds to the initial aspect of the
First Circuit's test. Both the Third and Fourth Circuits focus on
the facts that lead to a reasonable belief that the contraband
will be destroyed. 24 None of the courts assume that contraband
will always be destroyed or that the mere presence of persons
other than the defendant is enough to justify a warrantless
search. All examine the facts upon which such a belief could be
based.
118. Id. at 268-69.
119. See supra note 87-111 and accompanying text.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 91-98.
121. For instance, in looking to the second factor, the Court in Rubin noted
that the officers had found hashish dust on the defendant's clothing at the time of
his arrest and this supported their belief that the drug was in the process of being
packaged and distributed. Rubin, 474 F.2d at 269.
122. In Rubin, this factor was established when after being arrested the de-
fendant yelled "call my brother." Id. The officers could have reasonably believed
that accomplices had been alerted. Id.
123. The fact that evidence is narcotics establishes the ready destructibility of
the contraband.
124. See, e.g., United States v. Dart, 747 F.2d 263 (4th Cir. 1984) (court re-
jected government's claim of emergency after evaluating facts that lead to the of-
ficer's search of warehouse); United States v. Collazo, 732 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir.
1984) (court rejected government's claim that in light of recent arrests and wide-
spread publicity, the warrantless entry into defendant's house to arrest missing
suspect was necessary to prevent escape or destruction of evidence based upon an
examination of the fact), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1105 (1985); United States v. Tur-
ner, 650 F.2d 526 (4th Cir. 1981) (warrantless action justified since based on facts
that co-defendant told officers that premises were occupied by participant that
could have witnessed arrest); United States v. Velasquez, 626 F.2d 314 (3d Cir.
1980) (court reversed conviction when it found no objective indicia that contraband
was about to be destroyed); United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262 (3d Cir. 1973)
(court approved search after noting that defendant yelled "call my brother" when
being arrested in front of friendly bystanders); United States v. Wilcox, 357 F.
Supp. 514, 520 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (mere presence on premises of persons other than
defendants is not enough to justify a belief in a threatened destruction of evidence
and an ensuing warrantless search).
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After examining the existence of an emergency, the First
Circuit considers whether warrantless action could have been
avoided. 125 The first Rubin factor (the degree of urgency in-
volved and the time needed to obtain a warrant)126 asks the
same question. Both tests ask when probable cause first existed
and how much time it would have taken to get a warrant. 27
Both tests also require that the police not create the
emergency. 128
Although the First Circuit's final requirement, that the po-
lice use the least intrusive means possible if warrantless action
is necessary, is not explicit in the Rubin factors, 129 both the
Third and Fourth Circuits do, in fact, impose a similar limita-
tion. In United States v. Velasquez, 30 a DEA agent purchased
drugs from the defendant and arranged for a subsequent
purchase at defendant's home. While the agent was inside the
house, but before the sale was completed, several back-up of-
ficers forced their way in and searched the entire house, finding
drugs in a bedroom. 13 No arrest or search warrants had been
obtained. The Third Circuit concluded that the facts did not
justify the warrantless search: "We do not believe that the
125. See supra notes 99-109 and accompanying text.
126. Rubin, 474 F.2d at 268.
127. For First Circuit illustrating this approach, see supra notes 99-109 and
accompanying text. For Third Circuit examples, see Rubin, 474 F.2d at 268, and
United States v. Wilcox, 357 F. Supp. 514, 518-19 (E.D. Pa. 1973). For Fourth
Circuit examples, see United States v. Dart, 747 F.2d 263, 267-68 (4th Cir. 1984),
and United States v. Collazo, 732 F.2d 1200, 1204-05 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1105 (1985).
128. See, e.g., United States v. Collazo, 732 F.2d 1200-04 (4th Cir. 1984) ("Fi-
nally, if there was concern regarding the destruction of evidence in the immediate
aftermath of the arrest, that easily could have been cured by obtaining a warrant
to search the house for evidence prior to the Baltimore arrest. The government
will not be allowed to plead its own lack of preparation to create an exigency justi-
fying warrantless entry."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1105 (1985); United States v. Ve-
lasquez, 626 F.2d 314, 318 (3d Cir. 1980) (officers created emergency by forcibly
entering defendant's residence without warrant during undercover sale of narcot-
ics, alerting sellers to undercover agents identity and thereby endangering evi-
dence); United States v. Adams, 621 F.2d 41, 45 (1st Cir. 1980) (federal agents
created danger that escaped convict would evade capture by knocking on door of
hideout rather than seeking a warrant before attempting entry).
129. The third Rubin factor, consideration of the potential harm to the officers
if they merely guard the site while a warrant is sought, is an example of a less
restrictive alternative.
130. 626 F.2d 314 (3d Cir. 1980).
131. Id. at 316.
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threat of destruction of evidence, escape, or physical harm to
the police officers, justified the extensive search conducted here.
We therefore conclude that the search was overbroad and that
the evidence seized should have been suppressed as the product
of an unconstitutional search."13 2 Thus, the court faulted the
police for acting more broadly than the emergency required.
The Fourth Circuit has adopted a similar approach.133
Although the three circuits employing the examine-avoid
approach use two tests that sound very different, they evaluate
the presence or absence of an emergency in similar fashion. All
three circuits' careful scrutiny of the facts underlying the gov-
ernment's actions represents the traditional judicial skepticism
about police decisions to act without a warrant. All three cir-
cuits' use of the earliest time a warrant could have been ac-
quired as the measuring point in judging the existence of an
emergency tends to restrict warrantless action to circumstances
when a warrant could not have been obtained. Lastly, the
courts' insistence that warrantless action be as limited as possi-
ble encourages respect for the privacy protections of the fourth
amendment. This approach sharply contrasts with the uncriti-
cal approach used by several other circuits, to which we now
turn.
B. The Uncritical Approach
At the other end of the spectrum, in sharpest contrast to
the First, Third, and Fourth Circuits, are the three circuits that
accept police allegations of emergency without critical evalua-
tion of the factual bases of the claims and without considering
whether the police might have avoided the need for warrantless
action. This group is composed of the Sixth, Eighth, and Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuits. Each of these circuits applies a case-
by-case approach; none has a stated test for guiding the police
or trial coui-ts in evaluating the presence of an emergency.
132. Id. at 318-19.
133. United States v. Collazo, 732 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir. 1984). The court stated:
"The available government manpower at the house was sufficient to prevent flight
from the house, and entering the house created a situation of danger at least com-
parable to that which might have been presented by a fleeing suspect." Id. at 1204.
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(1) District of Columbia Circuit
The District of Columbia Circuit is the least willing to criti-
cally evaluate the police officer's decision, particularly in nar-
cotics cases.134 The circuit's sentiments were clearly expressed
in United States v. Johnson:
[E]xposure to only a few narcotics cases is enough to know that
evidence in the form of narcotics is peculiarly vulnerable to
speedy and easily accomplished destruction; and that very vulner-
ability is something that police officers in the course of their nar-
cotics enforcement duties must be unfailingly conscious of and
repeatedly speculate about if they are to function effectively to
protect the public interest. The District Court had no basis for
second-guessing the police on this question, and it can be hardly
be said to have erred in refraining from doing so on this record. 135
The facts of Johnson, however, hardly suggest an emer-
gency. Acting on a tip, police went to a building and through a
basement window saw drugs being packaged. It was the middle
of the night, and there was no reason to believe that the occu-
pants were aware of the police presence. Recognizing that
assistance would be needed to force entry, the officers returned
to headquarters. An Assistant United States Attorney advised
the officers that it would take one and one-half to two hours to
get a warrant and suggested that the drugs would in all likeli-
hood be removed in that time. Thirty to forty minutes after
their first observation, the officers returned to the premises, en-
tered without a warrant, and conducted a full search, discover-
ing evidence hidden in various places. 136 The court not only
failed to question the basis for the United States Attorney's sug-
gestion that the narcotics would be removed in the relatively
short time required to get a warrant, but also saw no reason to
require that the officers maintain the status quo and seek a
134. The District of Columbia Circuit's reluctance to be critical about a deci-
sion to act without a warrant is not limited to narcotics cases. See, e.g., United
States v. Hendrix, 595 F.2d 883, 886 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (court accepted police officer's
fear that waiting to get a warrant before entering suspect's apartment to search
for a sawed-off shotgun would present a danger, notwithstanding the fact that the
"fear" was based on the belief that the suspect, who had been arrested for disor-
derly conduct for firing a handgun at home, might be released on bail before a
warrant was obtained, a remove and easily avoided danger).
135. 561 F.2d 832, 844 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977).
136. Id. at 834-36.
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search warrant before taking the more intrusive action of con-
ducting a full-scale search. The court expressly rejected the
possibility of a stake-out until a warrant was acquired. 137 The
District of Columbia Circuit is unique in this respect, differing
from the two other circuits that also use the uncritical
approach. 138
The court's deferential treatment of the police's conclusion
that an emergency existed, and its unquestioning acceptance of
the estimate of the time required to obtain a warrant, sharply
contrasts with the examine-avoid approach. Similarly, the dis-
favor with which the District of Columbia Circuit viewed stake-
outs in Johnson is an implicit refusal to consider whether the
evidence could have been protected by a less intrusive alterna-
tive. As a result, there is no requirement that the police main-
tain the status quo while seeking a warrant once an emergency
is present. 139
(2) The Sixth and Eighth Circuits
The Sixth and Eighth Circuits also generally accept the as-
sessment by the police that an emergency exists. The refusal of
these courts to focus on the point when probable cause first ex-
isted contributes to their deference to police judgment. For ex-
ample, in United States v. Palumbo,14° the Eighth Circuit found
exigent circumstances present when, during the course of an
undercover drug purchase, one of the sellers unexpectedly de-
cided to accompany the undercover agent to get the purchase
money, which the agents had no intention of actually delivering.
The police decided to enter the sellers' hotel room, without a
warrant, to arrest the remaining participants before they
learned of the police presence and destroyed or removed the
drugs. Although the original plans did not call for this entry,
the possibility that everything would not go as expected was
137. Id. at 844. According to the court, "[sitakeouts are full of dangers that
the objects of it may thereby be alerted to the presence of the police, and can ac-
cordingly destroy or conceal the narcotics, thereby frustrating the police entry
when it finally comes." Id.
138. See United States v. Eddy, 660 F.2d 381, 383, 385 (8th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Korman, 614 F.2d 541, 545 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 952 (1980);
United States v. Delguyd, 542 F.2d 346, 352 (6th Cir. 1976).
139. See, e.g., United States v. Allison, 639 F.2d 792, 794 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
140. 735 F.2d 1095 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 934 (1984).
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certainly foreseeable. Moreover, the officers had probable cause
to search the hotel room even before they went to the hotel, but
they had not bothered to get a warrant. Nonetheless, the court
expressly rejected the prior existence of probable cause as a fac-
tor to be considered:
That the officers might have obtained a warrant before going
to the hotel is not fatal to the finding that exigent circumstances
justified their entry.... That the exigency might have been fore-
seeable does not invalidate the entry and arrest. The important
point is that the exigency, while perhaps not unexpected, was not
created by the officers. 141
Thus, unless the emergency is created by police action, the
Eighth Circuit refuses to consider whether it might have been
avoided and whether a warrant might have been obtained.
In United States v. Elkins,142 the Sixth Circuit went even
further, accepting a claim of exigency even though the emer-
gency was created by government agents. In Elkins, agents had
probable cause to believe contraband was at the defendant's
premises before they set out to complete a drug transaction that
they had set up. After the transaction was completed, agents
remained outside the premises, maintaining surveillance while
a search warrant was sought. Two cars began to pull out of the
driveway, but instead of waiting for them to drive out of sight of
the premises, "[a]t least six law enforcement officers and three
cars flashing blue lights drove up into the driveway to confront
the exiting vehicles and arrested their two drivers." 143 Fearing
that the occupants of the house, now alerted by the commotion,
would destroy the evidence, officers entered the house and
seized evidence.'" The Sixth Circuit, in evaluating the search,
ignored the fact that the officers had probable cause even before
they went to Elkins' house, and that the course of action that
later created the exigency was created by the police.
The three circuits in this group, although following the
same Supreme Court precedent and evaluating similar police
activity, decide cases very differently from the examine-avoid
141. Id. at 1097 (citations omitted).
142. 732 F.2d 1280 (6th Cir. 1984).
143. Id. at 1283. One car was driven by defendant's teenage son, while the
other car was driven by a person who was charged but acquitted.
144. Id.
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circuits. Unlike the examine-avoid courts, the uncritical courts
neither evaluate police allegations of exigency nor consider
what actions the police might have taken to avoid the need for
warrantless activity. By failing to include the previous exist-
ence of probable cause in weighing a claim of emergency, the
courts employing the uncritical approach give police officers no
incentive to obtain a warrant before an emergency arises. As
compared with the examine-avoid courts, the courts in this
group are much more likely to permit avoidable warrantless
intrusions.
C. The Examine-Only Approach
The last approach, utilized by the largest group of courts,
falls somewhere between the previous two groups. Like the
courts using the examine-avoid approach, this group is more de-
manding than the courts using the uncritical approach when
evaluating police claims of emergency. Like the courts using
the uncritical approach, however, these courts do not require
that police avoid warrantless action by planning. On the other
hand, they do not permit police to create the emergency. This
group includes the Second, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits. The Second Circuit will be discussed sepa-
rately, however, as it is the only circuit that has developed a
specific test.
(1) The Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits
The approaches of the Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits are similar. All apply a generally worded test
rather than a list of specific factors, and all require that review-
ing courts conduct a critical and independent analysis to deter-
mine whether the facts justify warrantless action. 145 As with
145. United States v. Thompson, 700 F.2d 944, 947-48 (5th Cir.) ([T]he gov-
ernment must demonstrate that the agents had reason to believe that the evidence
was in danger of imminent destruction."), later app., 720 F.2d 385 (1983); United
States v. Cuaron, 700 F.2d 582, 586 (10th Cir. 1983) (exigent circumstances exist if
a reasonably prudent, cautious and trained officer would conclude that evidence
may be destroyed before a warrant can be obtained); United States v. Blasco, 702
F.2d 1315, 1325 (11th Cir.) (government must demonstrate that the exigencies
prevented the agents from securing a search warrant), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 914
(1983); United States v. Kunkler, 679 F.2d 187, 191-92 (9th Cir. 1982) ("When po-
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the courts employing the examine-avoid approach, all of these
circuits require a factual basis for the warrantless intrusion and
do not accept police claims of exigency at face value.
For example, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the govern-
ment's claim of exigency in United States v. Torres,146 in which
officers investigating drug smuggling traced a large quantity of
marijuana to a house. The officers arrived at the house in the
early hours of the morning and arrested a man leaving the resi-
dence. At that time, the police noticed marijuana residue,
pieces of burlap, leaves, and seeds strewn around a van parked
in front of the house and leading to the doorway. The officers
entered the house, arrested the occupants, and seized evidence
in plain view. 147 The government argued that the warrantless
entry was proper to avoid the "risk of loss, destruction, removal,
or concealment of the marijuana."148 Suppressing the evidence,
the court found it improbable that the two hundred pounds of
marijuana involved could easily have been destroyed, holding
as follows: "There [was] no evidence that [the defendants] were
aware of the officers' surveillance; thus they had no reason to
destroy the contraband or to flee the premises."149 The Fifth,
Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have made similar
analyses.150
lice officers, acting on probable cause and in good faith, reasonably believe from the
totality of circumstances that (a) evidence or contraband will imminently be de-
stroyed... exigent circumstances justify a warrantless entry, search or seizure");
United States v. Rosselli, 506 F.2d 627, 630 (7th Cir. 1974) ("[W]arrantless search
is not justified unless the agents 'reasonably conclude that the evidence will be
destroyed or removed before they can secure a search warrant.' ").
146. 705 F.2d 1287 (11th Cir.), vacated en banc, 718 F.2d 998, on remand, 720
F.2d 1506 (1983), later op., 741 F.2d 1323 (1984) (defendants failed to establish
requisite expectation of privacy in house in which they were arrested and thus
lacked standing to challenge warrantless entry and search of house; decision did
not affect previous affirmation of co-defendant Gomez's conviction).
147. Id. at 1290.
148. Id. at 1297.
149. Id.
150. See, e.g., United States v. Driver, 776 F.2d 807, 810 (9th Cir. 1985) (the
court suppressed evidence stating, "[blecause of the intrusive nature of a warrant-
less arrest, the government must demonstrate specific and articulable facts to jus-
tify the finding of exigent circumstances, and this burden is not satisfied by
leading a court to speculate about what may or might have been the circum-
stances"); United States v. Thompson, 700 F.2d 944, 948 (5th Cir. 1983) (Where
police made a warrantless entry into defendant's home during the course of an
undercover drug operation; the court remanded because "[w]hat is missing in this
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Although these courts do not require the same level of plan-
ning by the police as do the examine-avoid courts, they give
more weight to the fact that a warrant could have been obtained
than do those that are less critical. The courts using the ex-
amine-only approach also consider the point at which probable
cause existed in deciding whether the urgency of the situation
required warrantless action.
For example, in United States v. Berick, 151 the police, after
arresting a chemist who illegally manufactured a controlled
substance, learned that four people remained at the laboratory
site, that they were armed and that the chemist was late in re-
turning to the laboratory. 152 The Fifth Circuit upheld the war-
rantless entry of the laboratory because there was not enough
time to get a warrant. 153 Such judicial examination of the time
necessary to get a warrant is also found in the decisions of the
Seventh, 54 Ninth, 55 Tenth, 156 and Eleventh 157 Circuits. These
courts encourage the use of warrants by considering the ability
to get a warrant in evaluating the presence of an emergency.
record is any actual indication that the agents entered Thompson's home because
they believed that they were faced with a 'now or never' situation ... where they
would have to seize the goods immediately or risk their disappearance."); United
States v. Cuaron, 700 F.2d 582 (10th Cir. 1983) (although the court did admit the
evidence, it closely examined the factual circumstances and concluded that the
emergency was real); United States v. Rosselli, 506 F.2d 627, 630 (7th Cir. 11974)
(The court suppressed evidence discovered after a warrantless entry into defend-
ant's apartment. The police had tried to justify that entry on an emergency caused
by the unsupervised freedom of another defendant's girlfriend after some of the
conspirators had been arrested with her knowledge. The government had argued
that she might try and contact the remaining defendant and alert him to the dan-
ger. The court rejected this possibility as not based on facts.).
151. 710 F.2d 1035 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 918, cert. denied sub noma.
Culver v. United States, 464 U.S. 899 (1983).
152. Id. at 1037.
153. Id. at 1038.
154. United States v. Rosselli, 506 F.2d 627 (7th Cir. 1974).
155. United States v. Impink, 728 F.2d 1228, 1231 (9th Cir. 1984) ("Where the
police have ample opportunity to obtain a warrant, we do not look kindly on their
failure to do so.").
156. United States v. Cuaron, 700 F.2d 582, 589 (10th Cir. 1983) ("The time
necessary to obtain a warrant is relevant to a determination whether circum-
stances are exigent.").
157. United States v. Torres, 705 F.2d 1287, 1297 (11th Cir.) ("even in the
middle of the night, a warrant can be obtained by telephone"), vacated en banc, 718
F.2d 998, on remand, 720 F.2d 1506 (1983), later op., 741 F.2d 1323 (1984).
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These circuits, however, do not insist that police avoid the
need for warrantless action by advance planning. Thus, this ap-
proach does not encourage police officers to "think warrant!" as
Judge Kelly of the Tenth Circuit urged in dissent in United
States v. Cuaron.158 For example, in United States v. Glasby, 59
the Seventh Circuit affirmed a conviction based on evidence ac-
quired after a warrantless entry of defendant's apartment when
the emergency on which the entry was based could easily have
been avoided. Police officers made a controlled delivery °60 of a
package to defendant's house at 7:10 a.m., a time when no mag-
istrate was available to issue a warrant. While waiting for a
warrant to be issued, officers keeping the premises under sur-
veillance saw the defendant's father leave the building at 7:45
and arrested him.161 The subsequent warrantless entry into the
defendant's house was sanctioned by the court because agents
"had seen the defendant looking out from the back porch of his
apartment and reasonably could have believed that he had seen
his father followed and that the agents who were coming toward
him would want to search his apartment for the heroin." 62 The
court ignored the fact that the delivery was controlled by the
police. There was no reason to execute this elaborate plan at a
time when a magistrate was unavailable or to arrest the father
within sight of the apartment. Similarly, the Fifth, Ninth,
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits all decide cases in this area with-
out requiring that police avoid the need for warrantless
action. 163
158. 700 F.2d 582, 593 (10th Cir. 1983).
159. 576 F.2d 734 (7th Cir. 1978).
160. A "controlled delivery" is the delivery of a package suspected of contain-
ing contraband under circumstances that are within the control of the investigat-
ing officers and make possible the identification and arrest of the originally
intended recipient. In this instance, a postal inspector was notified in Chicago that
two days earlier United States Customs officials had seized mail containing heroin.
The parcel had been mailed from Thailand addressed to the defendant's Chicago
residence. Upon receipt of the parcel in Chicago, further testing confirmed that
the substance was heroin. Officials photographed the contents, resealed the pack-
age in its original wrapping, and had it delivered to the defendant. Id. at 736.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 738.
163. See, e.g., United States v. Webster, 750 F.2d 307, 327 (5th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1106 (1985) (Where police made a warrantless entry of de-
fendant's hotel room at least ten hours after the police had probable cause upheld,
the court stated: "[tihat the exigency was foreseeable at the time the decision was
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The courts in this group, however, do prohibit the police
from relying on an emergency that they have created. In
United States v. Allard,16 4 police arrested a drug seller and
learned from him that Allard was his source. Police proceeded
to Allard's hotel room, knocked on the door and entered. 166 The
government claimed that exigent circumstances justified the
warrantless entry into the hotel room. The court held that
threatened destruction of evidence could not justify an entry
since there was no reason for the occupants of the room to know
about the seller's arrest until the officers knocked on the door. 166
If the officers had not knocked, there would not have been an
emergency.
Although not as clear as in the examine-avoid approach, it
appears that the examine-only courts also require that the in-
trusion be as limited as the circumstances require. No cases are
reported in which the court was faced with a police intrusion
that extended beyond a limited security check while a warrant
was being obtained. Language in the decisions implies that
such a procedure is mandatory. For instance, in United States
v. Cuaron,167 the court stated its rule as: "the circumstances are
made to forego or postpone obtaining a warrant does not, by itself, control the le-
gality of a subsequent warrantless search triggered by that exigency."); United
States v. Perdomo, 800 F.2d 916 (9th Cir. 1986) (where warrantless entry was
made into supplier's house after arrest of courier, and the location of supplier's
house was known to police before arrest, the court made no analysis of whether a
warrant could have been acquired before evidence was actually endangered);
United States v. Cuaron, 700 F.2d 582, 5894 (10th Cir. 1983) (According to the
dissent, over 20 officers were involved in the arrest, at least one of whom could
have been delegated to begin preparing for a warrant during the two and one-half
hours between the identification of the dealer's house and the warrantless entry.
If a magistrate had been sought and placed on standby, a telephonic warrant
would have been available on a moment's notice and certainly within the 50 min-
ute period between the courier's arrest and the entry into the premises.); United
States v. Harris, 713 F.2d 623 (11th Cir. 1983) (The Police made arrangements to
complete a drug sale at defendant's home hours before the planned meeting. The
deal went as planned. The undercover officer entered the home, inspected the
drugs and then left, ostensibly to get money. When he returned, he was accompa-
nied by a number of other officers who had fanned out throughout the house ar-
resting occupants and seizing evidence. Although seeking a warrant after the
officer left the house would have endangered the evidence, the need to enter was a
virtual certainty before the operation began.)
164. 600 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1979), later app., 634 F.2d 1182 (1980).
165. Id. at 1302-03.
166. Id. at 1304.
167. 700 F.2d 582 (10th Cir. 1983).
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considered sufficiently critical to permit officers to enter a pri-
vate residence in order to secure the evidence while a warrant is
sought."168
(2) The Second Circuit
Like the other courts that employ the examine-only ap-
proach, the Second Circuit determines whether an emergency
actually existed rather than merely accepting the police assess-
ment of the situation. Similarly, it does not impose an obliga-
tion to avoid warrantless action when possible. Nonetheless,
the Second Circuit's approach deserves individual treatment be-
cause the court has formulated a specific test, similar to the
two-tiered analysis suggested by Vale.169 The Second Circuit
distinguishes cases in which the police need to enter premises
to protect evidence from those in which, after a legal entry, po-
lice conduct a limited search to protect evidence. If the police
are legally on the premises, they may conduct a search to deter-
mine whether any persons are present with or without grounds
for believing that there are persons present or that an emer-
gency exists. This security check is similar in scope to the
sweep initially conducted in Vale, 70 although in this instance
the police must already be inside the premises. By contrast, if
the police must enter premises, either to prevent evidence from
being destroyed or to make an arrest, a factual showing of ur-
gency is required.
In United States v. Gomez,' 7' the court permitted police to
make an arrest after a lawful entry and to conduct a "security
check" or "protective sweep." The court defined this type of
search as a "very quick and limited pass through the premises
to check for third persons who may destroy evidence or pose a
threat to the officers."1 72 The court found authority for this ex-
ception in the reasoning of Chimel v. California,173 which 'per-
168. Id. at 586.
169. See infra notes 171-75 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 49-61 and accompanying text.
171. 633 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 994 (1981).
172. Id. at 1008 (quoting United States v. Agapito, 620 F.2d 324, 335 (2d Cir.
1980)).
173. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). The Court held that a search incident to an arrest
must be limited in time and place but could be justified because:
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mits a limited search of the person and the area within his
reach after a lawful arrest. 174
The circuit has used similar reasoning to justify a security
check:
The reasonableness of a security check is simple and straight-
forward. From the standpoint of the individual, the intrusion on
his privacy is slight; the search is cursory in nature and is in-
tended to uncover only "persons, not things." Once the security
check has been completed and the premises secured, no further
search-be it extended or limited-is permitted until a warrant is
obtained. From the standpoint of the public, its interest in a se-
curity check is weighty. The delay attendant upon obtaining a
warrant could enable accomplices lurking in another room to de-
stroy evidence. More important, the safety of the arresting of-
ficers or members of the public may be jeopardized. Weighing the
public interest against the modest intrusion on the privacy of the
individual, . . . a security check conducted under the circum-
stances stated above satisfies the reasonableness requirement of
the Fourth Amendment. 175
As was the case with the security check in Vale,176 and the
search incident to arrest in Chimel, the Second Circuit does not
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to
search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter
might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise,
the officer's safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frus-
trated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to
search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to pre-
vent its concealment or destruction. And the area into which an arrestee
might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of course,
be governed by a like rule. A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one
who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed
in the clothing of the person arrested. There is ample justification, there-
fore, for a search of the arrestee's person and the area "within his immediate
control"-construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he
might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.
Id. at 762-63.
174. See also United States v. Vasquez, 638 F.2d 507, 530 (2d Cir. 1980)
(where the court found that the reasoning in Chimel supported a quick security
check of premise following an arrest), cert. denied, Mesa v. United States, 450 U.S.
970 and 454 U.S. 847 (1981), cert. denied, Vasquez v. United States, 454 U.S. 975
(1981).
175. United States v. Agapito, 620 F.2d 324, 336 (2d Cir.) (citations omitted),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 834 (1980).
176. See supra notes 49-61 and accompanying text.
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require any factual showing other than a prior lawful arrest to
justify a security check. 177
The Second Circuit applies a different rule when police
make a warrantless entry solely to protect evidence from de-
struction 178 after an arrest or other exigency occurring outside
of premises that are thought to contain evidence. The court ap-
plies a two-part test. First, there must be a reasonable belief
that someone is inside the premises. Second, there must be a
reasonable belief that the persons in the premises are aware of
the events outside, thereby creating an incentive to destroy evi-
dence, escape, or jeopardize the safety of the officers or the pub-
lic. 179 The police must have a factual basis for their entry in
each case. 80 As with the Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits, the Second Circuit requires that police be
able to specify the facts upon which they base their claim of
exigency.' 8 '
The Second Circuit's approach resembles other examine-
only circuits because it does not require police to "think war-
rant" or to plan ahead to avoid warrantless action. For exam-
ple, in United States v. Martinez-Gonzalez,8 2 government
agents had probable cause late in the afternoon that an apart-
ment in New York City contained contraband. The agents de-
cided to keep the apartment under surveillance after an
Assistant U.S. Attorney told them that it was too late to obtain
a warrant. Later, when the tenant emerged, the agents walked
toward the suspect with their badges displayed. Not surpris-
177. Vasquez, 638 F.2d at 530.
178. Although the two types of cases defined by the Second Circuit's rules will
probably cover most circumstances in which the government seeks to justify war-
rantless action that is supported by the possible destruction of evidence, there is a
third potential pattern. Destruction of evidence could also be a justification for
entry in order to arrest, as well as for entry after an arrest (rule 2) or for a search
after arrest (rule 1). In Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), the Supreme
Court held that a warrantless entry to make a routine felony arrest is unconstitu-
tional, absent exigent circumstances. One such exigent circumstance might be
threatened destruction of evidence. When faced with this type of situation, the
Second Circuit uses neither of its own tests, but instead applies the factors enunci-
ated by the District of Columbia Circuit in United States v. Dorman, 435 F.2d 385
(D.C. Cir. 1970). See supra note 91 for a discussion of the Dorman factors.
179. Agapito, 620 F.2d at 336 n.18.
180. Id. at 336.
181. See supra notes 145-50 and accompanying text.
182. 686 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1982).
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ingly, the suspect retreated into the apartment, with the officers
at his heels. A warrantless entry and seizure followed. 8 3 The
court upheld the conviction without any consideration of
whether the decision not to seek a warrant was reasonable or
necessary, and whether the circumstances justified the officers'
precipitate action.
Although the Second Circuit test is stated quite differently
than the totality-of-the-circumstances test used by the other
members of this group, the outcome of a case reviewed under
any of them is likely to be the same. All of the courts in this
group conduct an independent examination of the facts underly-
ing the emergency, but none of them require that the police
make any effort to avoid the need for warrantless action.
In conclusion, threatened destruction of evidence is ac-
cepted in every circuit as a justification for warrantless action.
Although all of the circuits' rules sound similar on the surface
and can be paraphrased as a requirement that the police rea-
sonably conclude that evidence is in danger of imminent de-
struction or removal, the tests vary as applied. The courts all
require the same legal conclusion, but they do not consider the
same facts in reaching that conclusion.
III. A Hypothetical Case Comparison of the
Three Approaches
A similar case considered by courts using different ap-
proaches is likely to produce different results. The following
section seeks to illustrate this point by analyzing one hypotheti-
cal case using each of the three approaches described above.
For purposes of the following discussion, assume the police have
probable cause to believe that there are drugs in a particular
house, but do not obtain a warrant because they have no imme-
diate plans to enter. They arrange for an undercover officer to
buy drugs from one of the residents of the house. The sale takes
place several miles away, and the seller is arrested immedi-
ately. Although the police have no warrant, they believe there
is a serious risk that the evidence in the house will be removed
or destroyed. The officers' belief that immediate action is neces-
sary is based on many years of experience investigating drug
183. Id. at 96.
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traffickers, the ease with which drugs are destroyed, and the
fact that there is not enough time following the arrest to secure
a warrant. Accordingly, after the arrest, officers enter and
search the house, which has been under continuous surveil-
lance. They arrest several occupants and seize large quantities
of drugs found in closed containers.
A. Application of the Examine-Avoid Approach
If this case were being decided by the examine-avoid courts,
the evidence would be suppressed for three reasons. First, the
officers' belief that there was an emergency was based merely
on speculation, not on the facts of the case. The courts using
this approach require that police be able to articulate facts un-
derlying their belief that an emergency exists.'8 There was no
reason to believe that the occupants of the house would destroy
evidence. Moreover, there was no reason to believe they knew
about the arrest or the fact that they were under suspicion.
Therefore, there was no reason to think that the evidence in
this situation would have been destroyed before a warrant could
be obtained.
Second, the need to act without a warrant was avoidable.
The examine-avoid approach requires the police to "think war-
rant" and to prepare themselves sufficiently to avoid the need
for warrantless action.'85 The police had probable cause before
they set out to buy drugs from the seller, and because the possi-
bility that his arrest would make it necessary to enter the prem-
ises where the drugs were stored was foreseeable, there was no
reason for the police not to take a warrant with them.
Finally, the evidence would be suppressed because the
scope of the search was unnecessarily broad. The proper proce-
dure would have been for the officers to "secure" the premises
and obtain a search warrant before conducting a full search of
the house. 8 6
184. See, e.g., United States v. Palumbo, 742 F.2d 656 (1st Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1114 (1985); see supra notes 91-98 and accompanying text.
185. See, e.g., Niro v. United States, 388 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1968); see supra
notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
186. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 790 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1986). See supra
text accompanying note 111.
[Tribute
46http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol17/iss3/15
TRIBUTE TO BARBARA C. SALKEN
B. Application of the Examine-Only Approach
If this case were considered by courts using the examine-
only approach, the evidence would also be suppressed, but for
only two reasons. As with the examine-avoid approach, the ex-
amine-only courts require the presence of facts upon which the
police allege an emergency.18 7 Thus, the allegation of emer-
gency here would be rejected, because there was not a factual
basis for believing any confederates would destroy the drugs
before a warrant could be obtained. Second, the examine-only
courts would also suppress the drugs because the scope of the
search was too broad. They require that the police maintain the
status quo and obtain a warrant before conducting a full
search.'88
Unlike the examine-avoid approach, however, this ap-
proach would not require that the police avoid the need to act
without a warrant through preparation. Notwithstanding the
fact that the officers had probable cause before they set out,
they should have anticipated the need to enter and obtained a
warrant, and courts using this approach would have admitted
the evidence. If there had been a factual basis for the officers'
allegation that evidence was in danger, such as Rubin's com-
mand "call my brother"18 9 and if the officers had merely secured
the premises and sought a warrant before making a search, the
officers' failure to get a warrant would be accepted. The only
proviso is that the officers may not affirmatively create the
emergency. 190
C. Application of the Uncritical Approach
The courts using the uncritical approach would admit the
evidence uncovered by the officers. Unlike the other two
groups, these courts would accept the police allegation of emer-
gency. 191 Courts in this group refuse to second guess the police.
187. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 700 F.2d 944 (5th Cir.), later app.,
720 F.2d 385 (1983). See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
188. See, e.g., United States v. Cuaron, 700 F.2d 582 (10th Cir. 1983). See
supra note 167 and accompanying text.
189. United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262 (3d Cir. 1973).
190. See, e.g., United States v. Segura, 663 F.2d 411, 415 (2d Cir. 1981), affd
on other grounds, 468 U.S. 796 (1984).
191. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 561 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
432 U.S. 907 (1977). See supra text accompanying notes 134-39.
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They defer to the police officers' experience investigating drug
cases and recognize the easy destructibility of narcotics, even if
there is no evidence of an actual emergency in the case being
considered. 192 Additionally, this group does not require police to
avoid the need for warrantless action.193 Finally, depending on
the circuit in the group considering the case, the courts may not
require that the officers maintain the status quo before con-
ducting a full search. 194
D. Summary
It is clear that the circuits disagree about the permissibility
of warrantless intrusions based on the threatened destruction
of evidence. They also disagree about the factors that should be
considered in making the determination. The examine-avoid
courts closely examine the factual allegations that evidence is
endangered and require that officers provide articulable facts
upon which to base that allegation. They also require that po-
lice avoid warrantless activity if possible, and, accordingly, that
they look to the point at which a warrant could first be obtained
to decide whether the failure to do so was reasonable. Finally,
they limit the extent of warrantless activity by requiring that it
be the least intrusive possible in the circumstances.
The uncritical courts stand in sharp contrast. They accept
police claims of emergency without critical analysis. They effec-
tively elevate the ready destructibility of narcotics to a pre-
sumption that narcotics may be destroyed in every case. In
these circuits, warrantless intrusions are approved because de-
struction of evidence is conceivable, not because the danger is
necessarily present in a particular case. Not surprisingly, these
courts do not require that police anticipate possible emergen-
cies; as long as the exigency, foreseeable or not, was not created
by the police, warrantless intrusions are permitted.
The last and largest group falls between the examine-avoid
courts and the uncritical courts. These courts insist that the
danger be real and imminent, as do the examine-avoid courts.
192. Johnson, 561 F.2d at 844.
193. See, e.g., United States v. Palumbo, 735 F.2d 1095 (8th Cir. 1984); see
supra text accompanying notes 140-41.
194. See, e.g., Johnson, 561 F.2d at 834-36, 844; see also text accompanying
notes 134-41.
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On the other hand, they do not require that the police "think
warrant"; thus, their approach resembles the uncritical
approach.
The result of such divergent approaches is that the outcome
of a case depends on the circuit in which it is pending. This is
an unsatisfactory result when constitutional rights, theoreti-
cally national in scope and uniform in meaning, are involved.
Section IV discusses this need for a uniform rule and section V
proposes a rule to unify the circuits' approaches to the problem
of destruction of evidence. The rule balances law enforcement's
need for speedy and unrestricted action with the fourth amend-
ment's respect for individual liberty and concerns about over-
reaching government.
IV. The Need for an Appropriate Rule
The Supreme Court has not yet provided a clear and rea-
soned approach to determine when a threat of destruction of ev-
idence justifies a warrantless intrusion. The lower federal
courts have provided several different approaches to the prob-
lem, with varying results in similar cases. It is undesirable for
circuit courts to interpret constitutional rules differently. The
federal system has but one Constitution. Different interpreta-
tions of the Constitution produce unequal treatment of citizens.
Similarly situated persons should receive equal treatment
under the law.195
Although it has been said that intercircuit conflicts are in
some cases beneficial, 196 after a certain period of time the need
for certainty and uniformity outweighs whatever benefits are
derived from an ongoing debate among the circuits. 197 The cir-
195. See Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat
to the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARv. L. REv. 542, 601-02
(1969); Commission on Revision of the Federal Appellate Court System, Structure
and Internal Procedures: Recommendations for Change, reprinted in 67 F.R.D.
195, 206-07 (1975).
196. See United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 464 U.S. 165, 177 (1984) (White,
J., concurring).
197. See, e.g., Note, Using Choice of Law Rules to Make Intercircuit Conflicts
Tolerable, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1078, 1080-85 (1984) (the need for uniformity in the
federal circuits is premised on the notion that like situated people should receive
similar treatment and that since federal law has only one "correct" interpretation,
a lack of uniformity means at least one federal court is "wrong," a situation that
requires a solution).
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cuits have struggled with this problem for more than a decade.
It is time for a unified rule.
Most of the circuits do not encourage police officers to seek
warrants whenever possible. Such an approach permits war-
rantless searches that could have been avoided, and further cre-
ates the possibility that a broad new exception to the traditional
warrant requirement will emerge. Such an exception could de-
velop if the courts take the next step and rule that the mere
presence of drugs near the scene of an arrest or elsewhere per-
mits a warrantless seizure.
Prevention of destruction of evidence may thus continue to
be treated as a sub-class of the exigent circumstances exception
to the warrant requirement, or it may become, de jure or de
facto, a separate exception. The difference is crucial. Warrant-
less intrusions based on the exigent circumstances exception to
the warrant requirement must be based on facts known to the
officers making the entry.198 For example, in Vale, the Court
disapproved warrantless action because the danger to evidence
was too speculative when the police acted. 199 If destruction of
evidence, however, becomes a separate exception to the warrant
requirement, rather than a form of exigent circumstance, a
showing of need in the particular case may no longer be
required.
Both the automobile exception and search incident to arrest
are examples of this phenomenon. Although originally justified
by the need to preserve evidence from destruction in individual
cases, 200 each no longer requires such a showing. Each has be-
come a per se rule permitting warrantless searches, provided
the search is of a car 20' or pursuant to a lawful arrest.20 2 In both
198. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 457 (1948).
199. Vale, 399 U.S. at 34.
200. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (warrantless search of per-
son incident to arrest limited in scope to the necessities that justify exception);
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (warrantless search of car
stopped on highway upheld since automobile "can be quickly moved out of the lo-
cality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought").
201. The exception to the warrant requirement in automobile cases has
changed from one dependent on the facts of the particular case into one that ap-
plies without regard to the circumstances surrounding the search. This movement
is clear from the Court's decisions in Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964),
and Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). In Preston, the police arrested the
defendants and had their car towed to a garage. Shortly thereafter, the officers,
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situations, the Court has found that an emergency so often ex-
ists that warrantless searches now are permitted in all cases in
these categories. 203
Similarly, courts may find that destruction of evidence in
narcotics cases is so prevalent that warrantless searches will be
permitted whenever there is probable cause to believe narcotics
are present. If fourth amendment values are not to be compro-
mised, the destruction of evidence exception should be limited
to truly exigent circumstances. The justification for the war-
rantless search, therefore, must be a belief that an emergency
exists on the facts of the individual case.
without a warrant, searched the vehicle finding evidence. The Court suppressed
the evidence, holding that the search was unreasonable under the fourth amend-
ment because, inter alia, the men were under arrest and the car in police custody.
"[There was no] danger that the car would be moved out of the locality or jurisdic-
tion." Preston, 376 U.S. at 368. The search was illegal since there was no danger
of removal or destruction of the evidence. In Chambers, however, the Court upheld
the warrantless search of an automobile on essentially the same facts. The defend-
ants were arrested for robbery and taken into custody. The automobile was towed
to the police station, where officers conducted a thorough search, finding weapons
and evidence linking defendants to the robbery. The Court admitted the evidence,
holding that the search was within the automobile exception to the warrant re-
quirement despite the fact that the defendants and automobile were safely in po-
lice custody. Chambers, 399 U.S. at 52. This per se exception has been made
explicit by the Court in subsequent holdings. See United States v. Johns, 469 U.S.
478, 484 (1985) ("A vehicle lawfully in police custody may be searched on the basis
of probable cause to believe that it contains contraband, and there is no require-
ment of exigent circumstances to justify such a warrantless search.").
202. In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969), the Court limited
searches incident to arrest to those made either "in order to remove any weapons"
that may be used to resist arrest or effect an escape or prevent the concealment or
destruction of evidence; see United States v. Vasquez, 638 F.2d 507, 530, cert. de-
nied, Mesa v. United States, 450 U.S. 970 and 454 U.S. 847 (1981), cert. denied,
Vasquez v. United States, 454 U.S. 975 (1981). In United States v. Robinson, 414
U.S. 218 (1973), however, the Court held that a search of a person incident to
arrest was permissible without regard to the facts of the case.
203. In Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235, for example, the Court stated:
The authority to search the person incident to a lawful custodial arrest,
while based upon the need to disarm and to discover evidence, does not de-
pend on what a court may later decide was the probability in a particular
arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon the
person of the suspect. A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable
cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intru-
sion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional
justification.
51
PACE LAW REVIEW
V. A Proposal
Any rule based on the existence of an emergency should
first require a genuine belief that an emergency exists. It could
even require proof that the evidence is actually being destroyed
before a warrantless intrusion will be permitted. While the lat-
ter would greatly reduce the possibility of an unnecessary war-
rantless entry or search, it would also result in frequent loss of
evidence. The legitimate needs of law enforcement would be se-
verely compromised; fourth amendment requirements can be
met by a more flexible rule.
To resolve these concerns, I propose the following rule. I
will introduce and discuss each part of the four-part rule
separately.
(1) Even with probable cause to believe that evidence of
criminal activity is located on the premises, police must also
have a reasonable suspicion that evidence is threatened with
destruction.
This suspicion must be based on articulable facts present at
the time the decision to act must be made. If police are to be
permitted to act before evidence is actually being destroyed,
both police and reviewing courts must evaluate the probability
that evidence will be destroyed. One possible standard, with
which police officers are already familiar, is "reasonable suspi-
cion," as enunciated in Terry v. Ohio.204 Although reasonable
suspicion is something less than probable cause, 20 5 it does re-
204. 392 U.S. 21, 21-22 (1968).
205. As suggested by the Model Rules for Law Enforcement Series, the rule
could require that the officer have "probable cause to believe that such items are in
imminent danger of being destroyed or consumed." PROJECT ON LAW ENFORCE-
MENT POLICY AND RULEMAKING, MODEL RULES WARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF PER-
SONS AND PLACES 37 (rev. ed. 1974). This language is familiar to police officers.
Probable cause is the essential ingredient in all decisions to search or arrest. The
frequency with which officers must make that decision insures some familiarity
with its elements. But such a standard seems inappropriate in these circum-
stances. While probable cause is not the kind of arduous standard required in trial
settings (such as preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing evidence, or
beyond a reasonable doubt) it is a standard that normally is considered after some
deliberation. Probable cause is too rigorous for these circumstances. Although so-
ciety requires that it be "more probable than not" that evidence of criminal activity
be present in a residence before the government may enter one's home over one's
objection, even using force if necessary, it does not follow that it must be "More
probable than not" that an emergency exists before warrantless action can be
taken. The risk is that the evidence will be lost if immediate action is not taken.
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quire police to show "specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant [the] intrusion."20 6
Requiring articulable facts permits reviewing courts to de-
termine whether the fear that evidence would be destroyed was
reasonable. Judge Kelly, dissenting in United States v.
Cuaron,20 7 portrayed the dangers of accepting unsupported
fears of destruction of evidence, particularly where the fear is
based on the possible destruction by a drug dealer after the
arrest of his courier:
Of course, it is reasonable to guess that drug dealers... get
nervous when their couriers are delayed. They may indeed fear
that the courier has been arrested; but they may also fear that he
has been robbed by his customers, or that he has absconded with
their drugs or money. Who knows which reaction is possible, or
what the drug dealer's response will likely be? In the absence of
any limiting objective evidence, a policeman's speculation as to
what might occur is limited only by his imagination and his
preconceptions-or, as [the officer] might put it, his "experience."
An exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement
that may be established by a policeman's speculative fears can
scarcely be described as "specifically established and well-deline-
ated": it is better described as swallowing the rule. 20 8
Although reasonable suspicion is not a stringent standard,
it is appropriate in this context. Given probable cause by the
officer to believe evidence is in the premises, the only question
here is how certain the police must be that an emergency exists
that endangers the evidence before the officer may forego the
constitutional requirement of a warrant obtained from a neu-
tral magistrate. If, in a particular case, there is not probable
Given the prerequisite that there be probable cause to believe that seizable items
or people are inside the premises before one considers the question of whether evi-
dence is in danger, the element of risk present ought to accept a the greater error
quotient contained in the reasonable suspicion formulation.
206. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22. The Court continued, "And in making that as-
sessment it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard:
would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search
'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was ap-
propriate?" Id.
207. 700 F.2d 582 (10th Cir. 1983).
208. Id. at 592-93 (footnote and citation omitted) (quoting Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).
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cause to believe evidence was in the location searched, that
challenge may be separately made.20 9 The reasonable-suspicion
standard should assure that the police allegation of emergency
is not contrived. But the lower standard of reasonable suspicion
should be sufficient to enable a police officer to know when he
may make a warrantless entry. The standard also enables a
reviewing court to evaluate the officer's decision.
(2) The threat of destruction must be so imminent that a
warrant, expeditiously sought, cannot be obtained in time to pro-
tect the evidence.
Time is also an important element. The danger must not
only be real; it must also be imminent. The second part of the
proposed rule requires that there not be enough time to obtain a
warrant. The length of time required to get a warrant is an
essential consideration. One of the ironies of fourth amend-
ment law is that police are often permitted to excuse warrant-
less action by arguing that it takes too long to get a warrant,
when the only reason it takes so long is that law enforcement
agencies have created procedural barriers to the issuance of a
warrant that are not required either by the fourth amendment
or any court.210 To encourage the police to obtain warrants,
209. See, e.g., United States v. Chavez, 812 F.2d 1295, 1298 (10th Cir. 1987)
(where existence of probable cause to search business considered separately from
whether exigent circumstances justified warrantless entry); United States v.
Wulferdinger, 782 F.2d 1473, 1475 (9th Cir. 1986) (existence of probable cause to
search residence separate from consideration of whether exigent circumstances
justified warrantless entry); United States v. Moore, 790 F.2d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1986)
(whether existence of probable cause to search apartment considered separately
from existence of exigent circumstances for warrantless search of apartment);
United States v. Al-Azzawy, 784 F.2d 890, 893-94 (9th Cir. 1985) (probable cause
to arrest only one question, presence of exigent circumstance must also be found),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2255 (1986); United States v. Baldacchino, 762 F.2d 170,
174-77 (1st Cir. 1985) (probable cause to arrest considered separately from when
exigent circumstances justify warrantless entry into defendant's motel room);
United States v. McEachin, 670 F.2d 1139, 1142-45 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (whether prob-
able cause existed to search defendant's apartment considered separately from jus-
tification of warrantless search of apartment); United States v. Agapito, 620 F.2d
324, 332-33, 335-37 (2d Cir.) (probable cause for defendant's arrest considered sep-
arately from whether exigent circumstances justify warrantless search of hotel
room), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 34 (1980).
210. For instance, a writing is not constitutionally required for the issuance of
a warrant and yet a majority of states require that warrant applications be in writ-
ing. See generally R. VAN DUIZEND, L. SUTTON & C. CARTER, THE SEARCH WARRANT
PROCESS: PRECONCEPTIONS, PERCEPTIONS, PRACTICES (1984). This study by the Na-
tional Center for State Courts examined, among other things, the administrative
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courts must ask themselves whether the process is too time-con-
suming.211 Procedures that permit police to get warrants over
the telephone have been adopted by the federal government and
a number of states.212 These procedures reduce the time ordina-
rily needed to obtain a warrant and therefore reduce the need
for warrantless action.21 3 Regardless of the procedure for ob-
and judicial review procedures employed or required to obtain search warrants.
Included in its conclusions and recommendations was the observation that
[o]btaining a search warrant can be a time-consuming and frustrating pro-
cess.... Unfortunately, much of the intended effect of the Fourth Amend-
ment is lost because of the administrative impediments to obtaining a
search warrant and the consequent attractiveness of alternatives which,
while legally authorized in most instances, do not offer the same level of
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. As some of the ju-
risdictions we studied have demonstrated, these impediments can be over-
come with relatively little difficulty.
Id. at 105-06.
211. A number of courts have required that the police explain why they have
not used a telephonic warrant. See, e.g., United States v. Berick, 710 F.2d 1035,
1038 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 918 (1983); United States v. Cuaron, 700
F.2d 582, 589 (10th Cir. 1983); United States v. Jones, 696 F.2d 479, 487-88 (7th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1106 (1983); United States v. McEachin, 670 F.2d
1139, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v. Hackett, 638 F.2d 1179, 1184-85 (9th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001 (1981).
212. For federal statutes authorizing telephonic warrants, see FED. R. CRIM.
P. 41(c)(2). For state statutes authorizing telephonic warrants, see ALAsKA STAT.
§ 12.35.015 (1984); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3915(c) (1978); CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 1526(b), 1528(b) (West 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-202 (1985); Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 29-814.03 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 79.045(2)-(3) (Michie 1986); N.Y.
CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 690.36 (McKinney 1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1225(b)
(West 1986); OR. REV. STAT. § 133.545(5) (Supp. 1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 23a-35-5 to -7 (1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-4 (1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2.3(c) (1980); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 968.12(3) (West 1984). Cases in two other states
have authorized telephonic warrants. See State v. Andries, 297 N.W.2d 124 (Minn.
1980); State v. Valencia, 93 N.J. 126, 459 A.2d 1149, 1152-53 (1983).
213. The federal statute was intended to encourage use of warrants and re-
duce exigent circumstances as justification for warrantless action. The legislative
history makes that clear:
Use of search warrants can best be encouraged by making it administra-
tively feasible to obtain a warrant when one is needed. One reason for the
nonuse of the warrant has been the administrative difficulties involved in
getting a warrant, particularly at times of the day when a judicial officer is
ordinarily unavailable .... Federal law enforcement officers are not infre-
quently confronted with situations in which the circumstances are not suffi-
ciently "exigent" to justify the serious step of conducting a warrantless
search of private premises [sic], but yet there exists a significant possibility
that critical evidence would be lost in the time it would take to obtain a
search warrant by traditional means.
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taining a warrant adopted in each jurisdiction, the test for eval-
uating a threat to evidence should always be whether the time
needed to act to preserve the evidence was less than the time
necessary to get a warrant.
It is critical to determine when the obligation to seek a war-
rant arises. The earliest possible moment is when police have
probable cause to believe evidence of criminal activity is located
in the place to be searched. The Supreme Court has never re-
quired that police seek a warrant at the first possible mo-
ment.214 The Court reasons that police may legitimately wish to
delay the arrest of a suspect or the search of premises. Never-
theless, a policeman contemplating warrantless action should
always be mindful of the possibility of getting a warrant. The
need to act immediately once the police have decided upon a
course of action should not automatically justify a warrantless
intrusion if a warrant could have been secured before commit-
ment to action or if the need for speedy action was
foreseeable .215
(3) The circumstances giving rise to the threat must not
have been avoidable by reasonably prudent officers and must not
have been created by the police.
Police should have to avoid the need to act without a war-
rant if they reasonably can. This requirement is merely a corol-
lary to the principle that the police ought to be encouraged to
Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 1977 Amendment, FED. R. CRIM. P.
41(c)(2), reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 527, 534; H.R. REP.
No. 195, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1977).
214. See, e.g., Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 595 (1974) ("Assuming that
probable cause previously existed, we know of no case or principle that suggests
that the right to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car
under exigent circumstances are foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the
first practicable moment."); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310 (1966) ("The
police are not required to guess at their peril the precise moment at which they
have probable cause to arrest a suspect, risking a violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment if they act too soon, and a violation of the Sixth Amendment if they wait too
long."). But see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,470-72 (1971) (holding a
seizure of evidence unconstitutional because the police had the opportunity to ob-
tain a valid warrant, the Court noted that "where the discovery is anticipated,
where the police know in advance the location of the evidence and intend to seize it
... [tihe requirement of a warrant to seize imposes no inconvenience whatever...
in a legal system that regards warrantless searches as 'per se unreasonable'.. ).
215. See Harbaugh & Faust, supra note 53, at 227, for a similar proposal with
regard to warrantless entries to make a felony arrest.
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seek warrants. Although most courts do not require the police
to obtain a warrant at the earliest practicable moment, they do
not permit the government intentionally to create the exigency
that justifies a warrantless intrusion.216 The distinction affects
the point at which the court begins evaluating the presence of
an emergency, and this can produce very different results.
For example, when the courts require the police to avoid
warrantless action, they refer to the police's obligation to seek a
warrant before the emergency arises. In United States v. Col-
lazo,217 the court suppressed evidence acquired during a war-
rantless search of defendant's house because the police had
probable cause to believe evidence was in the house before the
emergency arose. The Collazo court stated:
[I]f there was concern regarding the destruction of evidence in the
immediate aftermath of the arrests, that easily could have been
cured by obtaining a warrant to search the house for evidence
prior to the ... arrests. The government will not be allowed to
plead its own lack of preparation to create an exigency justifying
warrantless entry.218
Thus, the court implicitly viewed the police to have an obli-
gation to seek a warrant when time permitted.
By contrast, courts that only require officers to avoid creat-
ing the emergency themselves focus on the point when the
emergency arose. United States v. Thompson 21 9 exemplifies this
approach. Although the Thompson court found the police had
probable cause the night before the warrantless entry,220 it held
that "[t]he agents' failure to avail themselves of the opportunity
to obtain a warrant does not, however, end our inquiry, for the
failure to obtain a warrant at the first opportunity is not a fatal
defect."22' Instead, the court saw the issue as whether the gov-
ernment created the exigency by using an undercover agent
known to one of the participants. The government had planned
216. See, e.g., United States v. Allard, 600 F.2d 1301, 1304 (9th Cir. 1979)
(threatened destruction of evidence attending police officer's knock on door held
insufficient to justify warrantless entry into suspected drug supplier's hotel room).
217. 732 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom. Alvarez v. United
States, 469 U.S. 1105 (1985).
218. Id. at 1204.
219. 700 F.2d 944 (5th Cir.), later app., 720 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1983).
220. Id. at 949.
221. Id. at 950.
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to gain lawful entry to the house by having an undercover agent
pretend to be a cocaine purchaser.222 The court would have per-
mitted the warrantless entry if the police had not known that
the defendant and undercover agent knew each other, although
the government could have obtained a warrant hours before the
need to enter arose and although the government planned to
make a warrantless entry into the suspect's premises.
(4) The invasion of forth amendment interests must be no
greater than the circumstances require.
Even if warrantless action is needed, the intrusion should
be as limited as the circumstances permit.22 If evidence is in
unavoidable danger of imminent destruction, police should be
permitted to take whatever action is necessary to maintain the
status quo, but they should also be required to seek a warrant
as quickly as possible before proceeding with a full-scale search.
In most instances the preferred procedure should be a se-
curity check or protective sweep followed by securing the prem-
ises while a warrant is sought. For example, if police have
reason to believe that suspects know of the discovery of their
criminal enterprise and possess evidence that is easily de-
stroyed, the police may permissibly enter the premises and
check the house for persons who might endanger the officers or
destroy evidence. The officers could not permissibly search for
evidence before seeking a warrant, because the emergency
would be over and the officers would have sufficient time to ob-
tain a warrant.224
In the unusual case, a more thorough search might be nec-
essary to prevent the loss of evidence. For example, in United
States v. Altman,225 after the police lawfully entered the defend-
ant's premises, they saw him drop something into a crawl space
in a closet. The officers lifted a trap door and retrieved nine
222. Id. at 949.
223. Limiting the extent of the interference with an individual's privacy is
consistent with general fourth amendment principles. See Chimel v. California,
395 U.S. 752, 767 n.12 (1969) ("And we can see no reason why, simply because
some interference with an individual's privacy and freedom of movement has law-
fully taken place, further intrusions should automatically be allowed.").
224. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 602 F.2d 458 (1st Cir.. 1979).
225. 797 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1986) (evidence actually in process of destruction
rather than threatened destruction).
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pounds of hashish floating in water. 226 The court permitted
what might normally have been outside the scope of a permissi-
ble warrantless search, since "it is plain that when [police] ob-
serve activity that indicates that evidence is being destroyed,
the agents may act immediately to save the evidence from de-
struction."227 But in no instance should the warrantless activity
be more intrusive than necessary to avoid the exigency that jus-
tified dispensing with the warrant in the first place.
The proposed four-part rule includes all the elements of the
examine-avoid approach used by the First, Third, and Fourth
Circuits. It differs from that approach, however, because it pro-
vides guidelines that permit the police to determine whether
the facts justify warrantless action. The rule's goal is to en-
courage police officers to get warrants whenever possible. Po-
lice officers are much more likely to follow a rule they
understand.
The proposed rule differs from those employed by the other
two groups because it is more faithful to the fourth amend-
ment's preference for warrants. Unlike both the uncritical ap-
proach and the examine-only approach, the proposed rule
requires police to avoid warrantless action if possible. Unlike
the uncritical approach, the proposed rule also insists that the
police be able to articulate reasons for their belief that an emer-
gency exists and that they limit the degree of intrusion to that
required by the circumstances. The experience of the courts
employing the examine-avoid approach shows that this aspect
of the suggested rule is workable. The proposed rule, by clearly
defining the circumstances in which police can take warrantless
action, will make it more useful both to the police operating
under it and the courts enforcing it.
Conclusion
Preventing the destruction of evidence ought to be a justifi-
cation for warrantless action in certain circumstances. A stan-
dard appropriate for evaluating whether an emergency exists
must accommodate the competing concerns of law enforcement
and privacy. Society has a growing fear about crime, but enthu-
226. Id. at 515.
227. Id. at 516.
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siasm for law enforcement may lead to aggressive police work at
the expense of the privacy protections provided in the fourth
amendment. Apprehension and conviction of criminals ought
not to be so difficult that citizens lose faith in the ability of gov-
ernment to provide protection. Yet every rule that seeks to con-
trol police behavior inevitably makes the conviction of some
criminals more difficult. Nonetheless, those rules are abso-
lutely necessary to prevent arbitrary governmental intrusions
of privacy.
The Supreme Court has mentioned the prevention of de-
struction of evidence as a justification for warrantless action. It
has not, however, defined the factual circumstances that justify
warrantless action in this context. The particular susceptibility
of narcotics to destruction and the nation's rising concern about
drug usage foreshadow an increasing use of the destruction of
evidence rationale to justify warrantless action. The circuit
courts have considered the question, but they have failed to de-
velop a coherent constitutional standard. Multiple views exist
as to when evidence is sufficiently in danger of destruction to
justify warrantless action, and as a result, the fourth amend-
ment's restraining influence on unreasonable police behavior
and its protections of individual's privacy vary from circuit to
circuit-as if they had different constitutions.
A standard that encourages police officers to obtain war-
rants when possible is needed. It should require police officers
to have reasonable suspicion that evidence is in imminent dan-
ger of destruction, and that suspicion should be based on facts
articulable when the decision to act must be made. The danger
must be so pressing that delay for the time needed to secure a
warrant threatens the evidence. The danger must also be such
that reasonably prudent officers could not have avoided the
need for warrantless action. Lastly, the intrusion must be no
greater than the circumstances require.
Such a rule will permit warrantless action when it is
needed, but it will also forewarn officers not to rely unduly upon
the possibility of warrantless action. Thus, the valued fourth
amendment right of privacy will be better protected from
erosion.
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